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I. INTRODUCTION
This bell is warranted for twelve months, accidents and improper us-
age excepted, and unless it shall be rung or struck before it is placed
in the belfry, or tolled by pulling or forcing the tongue against the bell
by a string or otherwise.1
Paul Revere
Section 2-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") requires
that a seller's affirmation or promise relating to goods being sold must
be "part of the basis of the bargain" between the seller and the buyer
to constitute an express warranty.2 The American Law Institute
("ALI") and National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws ("NCCUSL") are preparing revisions to Article Two of
the UCC and have circulated discussion drafts of section 2-313 which
1. Warranty offered by Paul Revere at the Paul Revere House (Boston, Mass.).
2. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a) (1991). The basis of the bargain requirement also applies to any de-
scription of the goods or any sample or model which is claimed to be an express warranty. Id.
§ 2-313 (1)(b), (c).
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abolish the basis of the bargain requirement. 3 The most recent discus-
sion draft provides that any seller affirmation, description or promise
made or furnished to a buyer that relates to the goods becomes part of
the agreement with the seller and is an express warranty unless the
seller proves that a reasonable person in the buyer's position would
conclude that the representation did not become part of the parties'
agreement.4 The purpose of this Article is to analyze the basis of the
bargain requirement and establish an economic basis for deciding
when a seller's affirmation should be considered part of the agreement
between the parties and therefore an express warranty. This Article
will then analyze the extent to which the most recent discussion draft
of section 2-313 circulated by the ALI and NCCUSL conforms to the
criteria for an express warranty indicated by this economic basis. This
Article will demonstrate that the draft of section 2-313 fails to follow
an economic based approach and instead inappropriately denies en-
forcement of seller representations as warranties, particularly to per-
sons who either are unaware of or fail to rely on such affirmations or
promises.
The basis of the bargain requirement in section 2-313 has been
rather mystifying to both courts5 and commentators. 6 Section 12 of
the Uniform Sales Act, the predecessor of section 2-313 of the UCC,
expressly required that a buyer rely on a claim about a product's at-
tributes for the representation to be an express warranty. 7 Under the
3. ALl and the NCCUSL circulated one proposed official draft on September 10, 1993, and
subsequent drafts or partial drafts in May 1994, August 1994, March 1995, August 1995, October
1995, and in January 1996. Insofar as the creation of express warranties is concerned, the August
1995, October 1995, and January 1996 drafts are, with several exceptions, identical substantively.
4. U.C.C. § 2-313(a)(2)-(3) (Tentative Draft January, 1996). A seller may make an express
warranty to a remote buyer, i.e., a buyer who buys from a seller other than the seller making the
representation. See, U.C.C. § 2-318(a) (Tentative Draft May, 1994). The warranty may be made
by any medium of communication to the public, including advertising. U.C.C. § 2-313(b) (Tenta-
tive Draft January, 1996). If the claimed express warranty is based on a communication to the
public, the buyer must establish that he or she was reasonable in concluding that the affirmation,
promise or description became part of the agreement deemed to exist with the seller. Id. § 2-
313(b)(2). The requirement in section 2-313(b)(2) that a remote buyer bear the burden of prov-
ing that he or she was reasonable in concluding that a representation became part of the agree-
ment represents a change from prior drafts of the section.
5. See Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F. Supp. 760 (E.D.Pa. 1977), aff'd 568 F.2d 770 (3d. Cir. 1978)
(discussing the reliance test for "basis of the bargain"); Pritchard v. Ligget & Myers Tobacco Co.,
350 F.2d 479 (3d. Cir. 1965); Indust-Ri-Chem Lab., Inc. v. Par-Pak Co., 602 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1980) (rejecting reliance as a factor in determining the basis of the bargain); Ewers v.
Eisenzopf, 276 N.W.2d 802 (1979) (establishing that a seller's affirmation need only be a factor in
the purchase and not the sole factor in determining the basis of the bargain).
6. See John E. Murray, "Basis of the Bargain": Transcending Classical Concepts, 66 Mn'. L.
REv. (1982) (discussing the difficulty in defining the "basis of the bargain" with clarity).
7. HAWKLAND, U.C.C. SERIES § 2-313 (1992) (noting the reliance requirement of the Uniform
Sales Act).
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UCC, however, the extent of a buyer's reliance on an affirmation or
promise about a good is uncertain. 8 The question of whether the
buyer even has to be aware of the seller's representation is uncertain
as well. 9 Although some courts have held that a buyer must prove
reliance on a seller's affirmation or promise for the representation to
be considered an express warranty,' 0 others have rejected the require-
ment."' Similarly, although commentators have argued that at least
some degree of reliance on a representation about a good must be
involved in the basis of the bargain requirement, 12 others have argued
for an objective test based either on what the expectations of a rea-
sonable buyer are in purchasing the good or upon the character of the
attributes of the product that the seller has promised to sell.13
The law's uncertainty about the need for proof of individual reli-
ance in the sale of goods is striking given the decreased emphasis on
that requirement for misrepresentation actions involving the sale of
securities. To bring a class action for violation of Rule 10b-5 under
the Securities Exchange Act,' 4 a plurality of the United States
Supreme Court has ruled that shareholders who purchase shares in a
well-developed securities market can invoke a rebuttable presumption
that they relied on misrepresentations to the market and need not
prove individual reliance. 15 The ruling was premised on the theory
that in a well-developed market the price of the stock reflects all pub-
8. See U.C.C. § 2-313 (1991) (failing to expressly establish any requirements as to a buyer's
reliance on a promise about a good or knowledge that any promise about a good was made).
9. Id.
10. For cases establishing that a purchaser must have known of or relied on representation for
the representation to constitute an express warranty, see Royal Typewriter Co.. v. Xerographic
Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d 1092, 1101 (11th Cir. 1983); Overstreet v. Norden Labs., Inc., 669 F.2d
1286, 1291 (6th Cir. 1982); Price Bros. Corp. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 649 F.2d 416, 422 (6th
Cir. 1981); Speed Fastners, Inc. v. Newsome, 382 F.2d 395, 397 (10th Cir. 1967); GLOBAL
TRUCK & EOuip. CO. v. PALMER MACH. WORKS, INC., 628 F. Supp. 641, 652 (N.D.Miss. 1986);
HAGENBUCH V. SNAP-ON TOOLS CORP., 339 F. Supp. 676, 680 (N.D.N.H. 1972); ANDERSON V.
HERON ENG'G CO., INC., 604 P.2D 674, 676 (CoLo. 1979); STAMM V. WILDER TRAVEL TRAIL-
ERS, 358 N.E.2D 382, 385 (ILL. APP. CT. 1976); SCARINGE V. HOLSTEIN, 103 A.D.2D 880, 881 (N.
Y. APP. Div. 1984); WENDT v. BEARDMORE SUBURBAN CHEVROLET, INC., 366 N.W.2D 424, 428
(NEB. 1985).
11. For sources rejecting the reliance requirement for express warranties, see, e.g., Lutz Farms
v. Asgro Seed Co., 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1167, 1177 (10th Cir. 1991); Winston
Industries v. The Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 317 So. 2d 493, 497 (Ala. Ct. App. 1975); JAMES J. WHITE
& ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-5 n.2 (4th ed. 1995).
12. BARKLEY CLARK & CHRISTOPHER SMITH, THE LAW OF PRODUCT WARRANTIES 4-27
(1984); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 11, § 9.5.
13. Murray, supra note 6, at 283; Thomas W. Coffey, Creating Express Warranties Under the
U.C.C.: Basis of the Bargain-Don't Rely on It, 20 U.C.C. L.J. 115 (1987).
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995).
15. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 (1988).
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licly available information, including a misrepresentation. 16 Thus, the
information for which the action is brought is imbedded in the price. 17
As this Article will demonstrate, in Part IV, this theory should be
equally applicable to sellers' affirmations or other representations in
the sale of goods and should result in elimination of the requirement
of individual reliance. 18
In the sale of goods, the question of whether a buyer needs to have
relied on or have had knowledge of a representation may arise in a
variety of contexts. For example, a purchaser of goods from a catalog
may order the goods without seeing a seller's promise or affirmation
concerning the goods. 19 Likewise, a purchaser of a product may be
unaware at the time of purchase of a seller's express promises or affir-
mations about the product contained on a card inside the container in
which the product is sold.20 Representations about the goods may be
made through advertising or commercials of which the buyer is una-
ware.21 Similarly, a seller may make promises or affirmations about a
product after the sale or contract for sale has taken place.22 Finally, a
seller may make a representation about his product that a buyer either
knows or, through the exercise of reasonable care, should know is
false.
16. Id. at 247.
17. Id. (discussing the theory that an investor who buys or sells stock relies on the integrity of
the price). The application of the Levinson "fraud on the market" theory is considered and
criticized in Jonathan R. Macey, et al., Lessons from Financial Economics: Materiality, Reliance,
and Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. REV. 1017 (1991). A consideration of
the nature of market efficiency implied by Basic and the requirement for its use in non-financial
contexts is presented by Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal
Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623 (1992).
18. For a comparable argument, see Robert S. Adler, The Last Best Argument for Eliminating
Reliance From Express Warranties: "Real-World" Consumers Don't Read Warranties, 45 S.C. L.
REV. 429, 470 (1994).
19. See e.g., Dilenno v. Libby Glass Division, Owens-Illinois, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 373, 376 (D.
Del. 1987) (holding that reliance is required for recovery for breach of express warranty that a
product will work as illustrated in a catalogue); Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp.
676, 680 (D.N.H. 1972) (holding that a plaintiff may not recover for breach of express warranty
when there is no evidence that he relied on the catalogue description).
20. Daughterty v. Ashe, 413 S.E.2d 336, 339 (Va. 1992) (holding that an appraisal placed in a
jewelry box at the time of sale constituted a warranty).
21. Representations in advertisements and commercials may be actionable express warranties
even when there is no privity of contract between the manufacturer or seller and the user. See
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 112 S. Ct.
2608 (1992); Drayton v. Jiffee Chemical Corp., 591 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1978); Keith v. Buchanan,
220 Cal. Rep. 392 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Spiegel v. Saks 34th Street, 252 N.Y.S.2d 852 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1964) (Uniform Sales Act case); Touchet Valley Grain Growers, Inc. v. Opp & Seibold Gen.
Constr., Inc., 831 P.2d 724 (Wash. 1992).
22. Bigelow v. Agway, 506 F.2d 551,555 (2d Cir. 1974) (concerning a representation by manu-
facturer's representative that hay could be bailed despite 32% moisture content).
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The question is whether under each of the circumstances described
above the buyer should be able to enforce the seller's affirmation or
promise as an express warranty. To answer this question, it is first
necessary to ascertain how express warranties are generated in the
marketplace. Secondly, one must ascertain the incentives that the law
should provide to sellers and buyers to assure that correct information
about product attributes reaches the market to avoid losses caused by
erroneous information or promises, as well as to minimize the transac-
tion costs due to search and contracting efforts.
To analyze these issues, this Article will begin, in Part II, by describ-
ing a market for complex products. Complex products are those that
have multiple attributes for buyers.23 Products sold with attributes in-
cluding warranties that offer remedies for failure are complex prod-
ucts. Part III will next present a market-based test to determine when
seller representations should be treated as express warranties. In Part
IV and Part V, this test is then applied in the contexts of pre- and
post-contract representations. This Article concludes that the test
suggested improves market efficiency, accords with how markets actu-
ally work, and can be applied easily and consistently. Moreover,
where an affirmation or promise about a good is false, the test pro-
vides the correct incentives for the person with the best access to in-
formation about its falsity to correct the representation or disclose its
falsity.
II. MARKET DETERMINATION OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS
The reality of today's products (both goods and services) is that
they are complex. Products are composed of a multitude of attrib-
utes.24 An attribute is a product feature which buyers value and which
23. See Kevin J. Lancaster, A New Approach to Consumer Theory, 74 PoL ECON. 132, 134
(1966).
24. The role of complex products, services, and activities was formalized by Kevin Lancaster
in the late 1960s. See generally Lancaster, supra note 23 (discussing theories on consumer behav-
ior). Although Lancaster focused on consumer behavior, Zvi Griliches extended the theory to
production, HEDONIC PRICE INDEXES FOR AUTOMOBILES, in U.S. CONGRESS, JOINT ECONOMIC
COMMITTEE, GOVERNMENT PRICE STAISTICS 87th Cong. 1st Sess. (1961), and market pricing.
See Zvf GRILICHES, PRICE INDEXES AND QUALITY CHANGES (Harvard Univesity Press, Cam-
bridge, MA. 1971). The model has been applied to a wide variety of products and markets:
general economic growth and innovation, R & D, PATENTS, AND PRODUCTIVITY (Zvi Griliches
ed., 1984); pediatric care, Fred Goldman & Michael Grossman, The Demand for Pediatric Care:
A Hedonic Approach, 86 J. POL. ECON. 259-280 (1978); boilers and turbogenerators, Makoto
Ohta, Production Technologies of the U.S. Boiler and Turbogenerator Industries and Hedonic
Price Indexes for Their Products: A Cost-Function Approach, 83 J. POL. ECON. 1-26 (1975); and
family life and activities, GARY BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1981). In many ways the
most rigorous statement of the model and empirical work can be found in the financial market
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is costly to produce. 25 A car's value (and cost) is derived in part from
the attributes for transportation, safety, comfort, entertainment, sta-
tus, and convenience of movement. 26 A house has market value since
it protects inhabitants from the elements, provides neighborhood
amenities, comes with public services and tax obligations, and offers
locational accessibility. 27
Products have attributes embodied in them only when some buyers
value those attributes above the seller's cost of producing the attrib-
utes.28 To the extent that marginal buyers29 enter the market and de-
mand attribute characteristics, the market will provide those attributes
to all buyers of the product.30 All buyers will receive the attributes,
literature. For a comprehensive review, see Stephen F. LeRoy, Efficient Capital Markets and
Martingales, 27 J. ECON. LIr. 1583-1621 (1989).
25. The importance and analytical usefulness of distinguishing simple from complex economic
goods was developed by Lancaster. See Lancaster, supra note 23. He initially defined goods in
terms of "characteristics" rather than attributes. With the development of Lancaster's new ap-
proach to consumer choice and production, the term "attribute" became more widely accepted.
Indeed, the term attribute, characteristic, and quality are used somewhat interchangeably in this
context.
26. See generally, Griliches, supra note 24 (discussing characteristics in products which make
them valuable to consumers).
27. Bruce D. Mann, The Influence of School Burning on House Values, in 2 RESEARCH IN
REAL ESTATE 31, 85 (1982).
28. This Article follows the convention of treating attributes as beneficial (positive) for the
consumer and produced by the manufacturer (seller). However, this treatment need not always
be the case. Attributes can be negative (costly) to the consumer (buyer); for example, a job may
have an unpleasant environment or involve heavy lifting. See Charles Brown, Equalizing Differ-
ences in the Labor Market, 94 Q.J. ECON. 113-34 (1980) (discussing the factors individuals weigh
in choosing employment). An attribute may be produced by the consumer; for example, child
quality and education in the home can be produced by the "consuming" parents. See Arleen
Leibowitz, Parental Inputs and Children's Achievement, 12 J. HUM. RESOURCES 242-51 (1977)
(analyzing the impact of family backgrounds on economic success). Finally, attributes can be
produced by third parties; for example, neighborhood conditions in housing markets can change
due to government action or neighbors behavior. See DOUGLAS B. DIAMOND, JR. & GEORGE S.
TOLLEY, Ti ECONOMICS OF URBAN AMENITIES (1982) (stating city housing conditions and
their effect on the market).
29. Marginal buyers are those individuals who are indifferent to paying the price for the prod-
uct or attribute and going without. See Thomas J. Holdych & George Ferrell, Individual Negoti-
ation of Warranty Disclaimers; An Economic Analysis of an Assumedly Market Enhancing Rule,
13 PUGET SOUND L. REV. 237, 246 (1990) (Other buyers are already willing to pay the price for
the product because the value they expect to get is greater than the price.). Marginal buyers
have the strongest incentives (since a small change in the product bundle or price can alter their
decisions) to search out alternatives and evaluate terms and conditions. These buyers, also, are
the ones who sellers can most easily influence by changing terms and conditions that are advan-
tageous to both buyers and sellers. Marginal buyers are the consumers who cause markets to
adjust prices, product bundles, and sales conditions. They discipline the market. Id. at 247.
30. The manner in which sellers determine the preferences of marginal buyers for product
attributes is not precisely known, but there are various methods of attempting to make that
determination. Sellers can conduct consumer surveys and product trials, but such information is
likely to be incomplete and lead to a trial and error process. See Holdych & Ferrell, supra note
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even those buyers who do not know of or value the attributes' exist-
ence in the product. Home buyers in "better" school districts, for ex-
ample, pay for this attribute even if they have no school age
children. 31 Non-smokers pay for the cigarette lighter in a car, even if
they never open the ashtray. The purchaser of a word processing
software package pays for the thesaurus, spell-checker, and outlining
features, whether he or she knows of or cares to use any of these fea-
tures. Thus, it is understandable that the market operates differently
for products with multiple attributes, and, because of this, a different
test should be used for determining whether a seller's representation
is an-express warranty.
A. Basic Operation of Markets for Complex Products
The force of our argument for adopting a new test for determining
when a seller's representation is an express warranty is based on an
understanding of how markets operate for complex products. There-
fore, we begin with a preliminary discussion of the operation of pri-
vate (for profit) markets.32
To simplify,33 a consumer who wishes to purchase a complex prod-
uct faces two choices. The buyer can determine ex ante all of the at-
tributes desired and then shop for each attribute separately. After
purchasing all of the desired attributes, the buyer can then assemble
them into a complex product. Alternatively, the buyer can search for
a bundle of attributes already assembled by a seller and purchase the
product as a whole. For example, a car buyer can shop for and
29, at 244-45 (demonstrating the manner in which sellers determine the wants of buyers). Any
seller who fails to satisfy consumer preferences will leave an incentive for other sellers to enter
the market to capture the first seller's forgone sales. Id. Ultimately the process is one in which
consumers reliably reveal their preferences through purchasing products that have been offered
to them. Id. Thus sellers finally have to wait until buyers demonstrate their preferences by
making committed purchasing decisions to the product. See Robert E. Smith & William R.
Swinyard, Information Response Models: An Integrated Approach, 46 J. MARKETNO 81-93
(1982) (maintaining that for many products consumers purchase a product only for trial to deter-
mine whether it satisfies their preferences and make a committed decision to the good only after
trial).
31. See Mann, supra note 27 (measuring the value change on single family homes in a housing
market when school district boundaries were changed).
32. For consideration of the way in which complex products can influence the development of
market institutions, see BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE NONPRoFrr ECONOMY 16-58 (1988).
33. More complex arrangements than discussed here are possible. For example, buyers may
buy partially bundled products and purchase other attributes in after markets to create a pre-
ferred bundle. Buyers may self-produce part of the preferred bundle. In some circumstances
buyers may unbundle a complex product. However, for purposes of discussion, this simple ex-
ample is sufficient. More complicated bundling procedures do not alter the basic result de-
scribed above.
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purchase all the component parts for a car-the steering wheel, brak-
ing system, engine, air conditioner, etc. After collecting all of the indi-
vidual parts, the consumer can then assemble them into a car with the
desired attribute bundles (including, perhaps, an insurance policy on
each of the parts). Alternatively, the buyer can go to a car dealer and
purchase all the parts put together (including, perhaps, a warranty).
Although most buyers choose the latter approach for automobiles,
they do not do so for some other products. For example, stereophonic
systems are sold both prepackaged and by component parts. Some
people search for the attributes they want and bundle systems to-
gether, while others purchase prepackaged systems. Thus, the market
accommodates both types of buying behavior.
Sellers of products provide the most profitable shopping opportuni-
ties for buyers. The type of product (the bundle) sellers put into the
stream of commerce will depend on what buyers are willing to pay
relative to the sellers' costs of production. It will be more profitable
for sellers to bundle attributes into complex products rather than sell
attributes separately when the seller's cost of bundling is less than the
amount the buyer will pay for the bundled product and less than the
buyer's cost of purchasing and bundling the attribute himself. The
seller's cost of purchasing (or producing) the components and bun-
dling may be less than the buyer's cost of procuring the attribute com-
ponents separately and bundling them for two reasons. The seller's
specialization and division of labor may create a comparative advan-
tage in bundling. This production cost advantage is the traditional ef-
ficiency reason for firms to emerge in a market system and earn the
reward of profit.34
The seller also may exploit non-production cost advantages by re-
ducing the search cost for buyers. When buyers shop for and purchase
individual attributes, buyers may incur high transaction costs. These
transaction costs include searching for sellers, obtaining price and
quality information about the components, traveling to make the
purchases, and contracting (explicitly or implicitly) with a multitude of
sellers. When a seller bundles the attributes into a complex product, a
buyer need only incur one set of these transactions costs. The bun-
dling of attributes into complex products, then, can produce transac-
tion cost savings for the buyers.
Since it can be advantageous for buyers (receiving a product at a
lower cost than if they self-produced it) and profitable for sellers (the
34. See Sherwin Rosen, Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure
Competition, 82 J. POL. ECON. 34, 41 (1974) (discussing production decisions).
1996] 789
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amount the buyer will pay is more than the seller's cost of produc-
tion), markets for complex products emerge. Indeed, a variety of
product-type markets will develop responding to the relative costs and
benefits for bundling attributes into complex products.35 Some mar-
kets will exist where buyers can purchase attributes separately and
produce the bundles themselves, such as markets for stereo compo-
nents and automobile detailing. Other markets will be for the com-
plex product itself-the stereo component system or the finished
automobile. Over time, as the market for computer systems demon-
strates, different markets will develop to provide different bundles of
attributes to a heterogeneous set of buyers. 36
Therefore, an important consequence of markets for complex prod-
ucts is the reduction in cost through lower production costs or elimina-
tion of some transaction costs, or both. A market for complex
products, then, improves the overall efficiency of resource allocation
within the economic system by reducing the real cost of producing a
unit of output. This improvement in efficiency produces the typical
benefits for society: the potential for increased total output, higher
real incomes for consumers, and reduced resource cost per unit of out-
put. As with any voluntary exchange, the market for a complex prod-
uct is a positive sum game which increases the level of welfare for
society.37
Although the markets for complex products are desirable and en-
hance efficiency, they introduce or exacerbate the problem of infor-
mational asymmetry. Informational asymmetry occurs when one
party to a bargain has information that is valuable but unobtainable
by the other party.38 With a complex product the seller generally
knows more about the specific attribute bundle and the overall quality
of the product than does the buyer, or the cost to the buyer of ascer-
35. See Rosen supra note 34, at 34 (discussing the market for differentiated products).
36. See, e.g., Dennis Epple, Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Estimating Demand and
Supply Functions for Differentiated Products, 95 J. POL ECON. 59, 80 (1987) (identifying
problems in hedonic models and resolutions for those problems); Rosen, supra note 34, at 55
(outlining a model of product differentiation based on the hedonic hypothesis of goods valua-
tion); Richard Schmalensee, Imperfect Information and the Equality of Competitive Prices, 99 Q.
J. ECON. 441, 460 (1984) (discussing economists' contributions to public policy debates concern-
ing equity in the area of automobile insurance).
37. Markets for complex products may not generate the optimal set of outcomes due to the
standard problems of market failure. Moreover, special problems related to informational asym-
metries may impair the functioning of markets. See infra text acompanying notes 62-63 (discuss-
ing the problem of informational asymmetry). However, even if operating at a non-optimal
level, these markets will still generate positive net benefits for society.
38. See generally Nancy A. Lutz, Warranties as Signals Under Consumer Moral Hazard, 20
RAND J. ECON. 239, 248-249 (1989) (discussing asymmetric information and its effect on
warranties).
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taining the bundle composition or quality is greater than the value of
the complex product. With informational asymmetry, the buyer may
become reluctant to purchase the product or may have to expend con-
siderable resources to obtain attribute and quality information. 39 To
avoid these buyer responses, the seller can include in the bundle a
statement reassuring, with a valuable claim, the buyer about the at-
tributes and the quality level contained therein. This type of state-
ment (an express warranty, for example) acts as a signal to the buyer
about the contents and quality of the complex product. The signal
itself, then, becomes an attribute in the complex product's bundle.
The signal has value to the buyer because it eliminates the need for
the buyer to inspect, test, or examine the product completely. In addi-
tion, including the signal in the complex product's bundle is profitable
for the seller since it allows the seller to convey information to the
buyer in a cost-effective manner. 40
Markets for complex products, then, perform the important func-
tion of improving economic efficiency. Both buyers and sellers are in
improved circumstances with complex markets. With the seller's as-
surance, the buyer is no longer reluctant to purchase the product. By
cost-effectively assuring the market of its product attributes, the seller
makes a profit. To the extent sellers cannot cost-effectively make
these "assurance" claims to buyers, the efficiency of markets for com-
plex products will be hindered.
B. Pricing the Complex Product
Just as market operation differs for complex and simple products, so
does the pricing system. The price of a product depends on the bun-
dle of attributes embodied in the product.41 The market will establish
any product's price so that the subjective value or utility to a willing
buyer is equal to or greater than the value of any other alternative
bundle (the opportunity cost), whether or not the buyer prefers all the
attributes in the bundle purchased. In addition, the value received by
the seller - the price paid by the buyer - is equal to or greater than
the cost of bundling the attributes into the product.42
39. Id.
40. See id. at 243 (discussing the effects of consumer information on the seller's profits).
41. See generally Lutz, supra 38, at 240-245 (stating how utility effects prices and
consumption).
42. The reason that a product is composed of a particular set of attributes may be a function
of both production technology and legal constraints. Sellers bundle attributes in the product
when it is cost-effective. When the buyer will pay more for the product with the attribute than
without and when the increased price is greater than the seller's cost of adding the attribute to
the bundle, the seller will provide the attribute as part of the product. When buyers can add the
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An understanding that the market price is the payment for all of the
attributes embodied in a product is important. Not all attributes will
be desired by all consumers; indeed, not all consumers need be aware
of all attributes in a product. A consumer purchases a product when
the desired bundle of attributes is available at a price below the indi-
vidual's subjective valuation.43 The product purchased may have ad-
ditional attributes that the buyer is unaware of or does not value.44
However, the market price will reflect the cost of all the attributes in
the product. Buying a product means paying for all the attributes
bundled in the product whether or not the buyer knows of their exist-
ence or prefers to purchase them.
Because all consumers are not knowledgeable about all attributes
does not mean that markets are inefficient and do not create the cor-
rect set of attributes for products. As long as the marginal buyers
express preferences and search for desired attributes, the market will
attribute themselves at a lower cost than the seller can, either due to a comparative cost advan-
tage or because too few of the buyers will pay for the seller's action, then buyers will purchase
the attribute separately (in an after market, for example). In some cases, however, some attrib-
utes are costly or impossible to unbundle from other attributes. Thus, auto makers offer passive
and non-passive safety restraints as part of an automobile bundle. See generally 49 C.F.R. § 571
(1994) (stating various safety features in automobiles). In additional instances, by public policy,
sellers cannot unbundle an attribute from a product. For example, unreasonably dangerous
products must be sold with insurance for accidents. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A (1965) (addressing the liability of sellers of products for physical harm to users or con-
sumers). In many cases disclaiming the implied warranty of merchantability is too costly to be
feasible. Under the Magnuson-Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2308 (1994), implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness cannot be disclaimed if the kinds of express warranties governed by
that act are offered. In other cases, when attributes can be purchased separately, specialty mar-
kets develop and these attributes are not bundled into the product itself. Thus, detail painting,
sunroofs, or special stereo equipment are traded in the after-market for automobiles. Extended
warranties and service contracts are offered separately from the product. But, in both cases,
whether embodied in the basic product or purchased separately, a buyer pays for the attribute.
43. Purchase and sale can have one of two meanings: 1) trading in an explicit market transac-
tion, the exchange of money (or credit) for an item; or 2) maintaining possession rather than
exchanging in the market, the purchase from (or sale to) oneself. If the value of a product
changes because of a change in the product's bundle, the owner (the buyer) can either sell (or
the purchaser acquire) the product (type 1 exchange) or the owner can keep the product being a
buyer and seller simultaneously (type 2 transaction). By maintaining possession the owner is
forgoing the benefits of a sale (the opportunity cost of buying the next best alternative item) and
is acting as a buyer. For example, households often act as implicit purchasers for durable goods,
especially in housing markets. See MARTIN CADWALLADER, MIGRATION AND RESIDENTIAL
MOmLrrY (1992) (discussing homeowners as consumers).
44. For example, a consumer of milk may only be interested in purchasing milk that contains
2% fat and does not care that the milk comes with vitamin D fortification. Even though the
buyer may not value the vitamin D attribute, the attribute comes with the bundle. Thus, as long
as the 2% milk is priced to attract buyers, the existence of additional attributes is not relevant.
As the Article notes above, however, the buyer will pay for the additional attributes, even
though the attributes may not have entered into the buyer's decision to purchase. See infra text
accompanying notes 30-31.
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obtain information about the value of attributes. Producers, searching
for profitable opportunities, have an incentive to find that informa-
tion, or experiment with attributes and bundles that they hope will be
valuable to consumers. As this information and experimentation oc-
curs, new bundles, products, and prices will enter the market in re-
sponse to consumer needs and interests. 45
A product's market price is an index reflecting the amounts of all
attributes in a particular item. One ball-point pen is priced higher
than another because it has more attributes; one house is worth more
on the market because its attribute bundle yields more satisfaction
than a seemingly "similar" house; the mere prestige of a car will in-
crease its price in the market. Although a product's price measures
the value of the attributes embodied in the product, the market re-
flects the changing demands of consumers and production costs by
adjusting either product prices or the attribute bundles in products.
During the 1970s and 1980s, for example, American car manufacturers
changed the attribute bundles of cars by offering extended warranty
terms, more safety, and additional convenience.46 Dry paper copier
manufacturers added features for duplexing, color copying, sorting,
and collating as well as producing traditional simple copies.47
An absence of reliance or bargaining by a buyer with respect to an
attribute does not imply that an attribute is not part of the bundle
purchased by the buyer. Rather, it implies that the product has the
market determined amount of attributes and that the buyer is paying
for these attributes. Of course, buyers desiring special, extra-market
terms or attributes will bargain for these items. For example, if a new
car buyer wants an extended warranty on a vehicle, he or she will
individually negotiate and pay for the warranty.
45. Market imperfections, such as barriers to entry or exit, will reduce the ability of buyers
and sellers to adjust and generate new bundles and opportunities. Our discussion here does not
consider the impact of such imperfections. To the extent that markets remain contestable, that
information is readily obtainable, and that extra-market conditions (licenses, patents, etc.) do
not completely frustrate adjustments, competitive adjustments of both bundle attributes and
terms will be realized. For the possibility of warranty imperfections, see Michael Spence, Con-
sumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Product Liability, 44 REv. ECON. STUD. 561, 572
(1977) (analyzing problematic products and market intervention). For an example of possible
legal issues related to informational failure, see Jeff Sovern, Toward a Theory of Warranties in
Sales of New Homes: Housing the Implied Warranty Advocates, Law and Economics Mavens,
and Consumer Psychologists Under One Roof, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 13, 103.
46. See Carmakers Are Driving the Risk Out of Buying, Bus. WK., Oct. 24, 1988, at 31 (giving
an example of auto makers' changes in warranty terms).
47. See Color It User Friendly, Bus. WK., June 8, 1992, at 64-65 (providing an example of the
changes in copier attributes).
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Although the idea may appear anomalous to some, it is efficient for
some (or even most) buyers not to bargain for or even be aware of all
attribute terms, not to perform a detailed inspection of every aspect of
a product, and not to inquire explicitly into every attribute.48 The
time and cost of complete inspection and explicit bargaining or reli-
ance would exceed the value of most attributes.49 The inefficiency of
inspection and bargaining is most evident in the case of low-priced,
repeat purchase items such as ball point pens. It would not be effi-
cient for a purchaser to disassemble a pen prior to purchase and con-
duct a metallurgical test of the pen's spring to determine how well it
would function and how long it probably would last.
The same conclusion is true even for more expensive products in-
cluding consumer durable goods. A purchaser of a nineteen inch
color television set would probably not find it cost-effective to have
tests conducted on or enter into extensive bargaining with respect to
the life and quality of the picture tube to assure that it is marginally
better than comparable sets on the market. Requiring consumer
knowledge about all attributes, including warranty terms, would be
inefficient. 50
Even if some consumers are unaware of some product attributes,
the market price will reflect the cost of producing all attributes in the
bundle. To the extent, then, that the bargain agreed to is for all the
attributes paid for, unexamined and unknown attributes will be part of
the basis of the bargain.51
C. Warranties as Attributes
Warranties provide product attributes for a consumer in the same
sense that all other characteristics of the product are attributes. In
addition to a quality signal, the value of a warranty to a consumer can
include the ability to reject or revoke acceptance of a product,52 ob-
48. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 6, at 322-23 (arguing that failure to enforce seller's represen-
tations in manuals because the manuals were not read prior to sale would cause buyers to take
the unnecessary precaution of reading all manuals prior to sales).
49. Cost-effective buyer inspection will be efficient and should have an effect on the enforce-
ability of affirmations and promises as warranty terms. See infra part II.E (supporting full disclo-
sure between a buyer and seller) and part IV.2.D (discussing buyer or use of expert opinion).
50. No purpose would be served by devoting resources to bargaining when unbundling a
product's attributes is impossible, either for technological reasons or due to legal constraints.
51. That consumers sometimes receive product attributes that they did not explicitly bargain
for or even know about is consistent with the implied warranty of merchantability. See U.C.C.§ 2-314 (1991) (requiring neither knowledge nor reliance for the implied warranty of
merchantability to be valid).
52. See U.C.C. § 2-601 (1991) (stating generally a buyer's specific right to reject all or part of a
delivery containing non-conforming goods); U.C.C. § 2-608 (1991) (emphasizing a buyer's spe-
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tain monetary relief,53 or return an item for repair or replacement, 54
thus offering a direct form of insurance against product failure or mal-
function. For the seller, the warranty attribute can be valuable as a
quality signal which reduces or eliminates what is termed the "lem-
ons" 55 problem. The "lemons" problem refers to a particular form of
market failure when sellers have significant informational advantages
over buyers. For example, if used car sellers know the quality of their
cars but buyers do not and cannot obtain that information, sellers of
higher than average quality cars will withhold them from the market
and buyers will purchase cars with a lower quality than expected. If
the problem of information differences cannot be overcome, the will-
ingness of buyers to purchase may decline to zero as the quality of
cars sellers offer to the market continues to decline. The market will
fail, even though at some positive prices in the market sellers would
find it profitable to sell and buyers would be willing to purchase.
On a similar basis, assurance about quality and the attributes con-
tained in the bundle is beneficial to the buyer and the seller to the
extent that it solves or reduces the problems resulting from informa-
tional asymmetry. The provision of a warranty reduces the cost to the
buyer of inspecting and negotiating about the particulars of the prod-
uct and the means of correcting defects. The warrenty lowers the
transaction cost of the exchange for both the buyer and the seller.
In addition, for some sellers a warranty can provide a profitable
opportunity to perform service and repair work when the seller has a
comparative advantage in these areas. 56 The seller may also have a
cific right to revoke acceptance of a delivery containing non-conforming goods where the value
to the buyer is substantially impaired).
53. See U.C.C. §§ 2-714, 2-715 (1991) (granting buyers the right to sue a breaching seller for
damages).
54. "Warranties, in both commercial and consumer transactions, commonly provide that a
buyer's remedy for a nonconforming good is to have the product repaired or replaced by the
seller." JULIAN B. MCDONNELL & ELIZABETH J. COLEMAN, COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER
WARRANTIES: DRAFnNG, PERFORMING AND LmOATING 7.01 (1990) (discussing the use,
drafting and enforceability of warranty remedies limited to repair or replacement of noncon-
forming goods).
55. For a discussion of market responses and a test of warranties as signals, see William
Boulding & Amna Kirmani, A Consumer-Side Experimental Examination of Signaling Theory:
Do Consumers Perceive Warranties as Signals of Quality?, 20 J. CONS. RES. 111, 123 (1993) (dis-
cussing consumer's perceptions of warranties within the framework of the economic signaling
theory).
56. George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1308
(1981) (finding consumer will purchase repairs from seller when seller's price is less than cost of
providing repairs by consumer). The warranty provided by the seller acts like an insurance pol-
icy. A seller will offer the insurance when the seller receives more in payment (from all buyers)
for the insurance feature than it will cost the seller to provide the service. A buyer will be willing
to pay for the insurance feature when the cost of the feature is less than the cost to the buyer of
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cost advantage in the general inclusion of insurance to buyers of the
product. Because of the value to consumers and the benefit to sellers,
warranty terms will be offered and priced in the market.57
As a cost-effective method, sellers ordinarily will offer general war-
ranty terms to the market for all consumers to purchase. If sellers did
not offer warranty terms to the market as a whole, they would have to
negotiate with each consumer individually for each desired term, a
process that would be costly and time consuming. General terms will
be offered, especially when sellers want to use warranties as signals of
quality. Special warranty terms will be negotiated between a buyer
and seller when a consumer's special needs are important or when a
seller has a particular cost advantage in producing desired warranty
protection. Thus, warranty terms will enter the price of the product
both through generalized market behavior and through particularized
negotiations.
D. Warranties and Insurance Problems
Because warranties offer a form of insurance, two particular
problems may arise. A moral hazard problem is possible with insur-
ance because a consumer has an incentive to use the product in a fash-
ion which may more likely (than without the insurance) cause a
problem covered by the warranty.58 When this result occurs, the cost
of providing the insurance through the warranty is greater than if the
consumer were induced to take more care and prevent the problem
from occurring. In general, moral hazard causes an inefficient use of
resources through excessive repair costs.
providing repairs himself. A seller will be able to provide the service at a lower cost than a
buyer when the seller has a comparative advantage at repair work due to the seller's specialized
production expertise. The buyer implicitly pays for this insurance when the buyer purchases the
product with the warranty included. See supra sections II.C and D. Since not all buyers will
experience the problem and present warranty claims requiring service work, each buyer will pay
only a portion (the expected value of the repair cost) of the cost of repair for the warranty
attribute. The seller is able to offer the insurance term profitably when the claims costs are less
than the amount paid by buyers in this form of the "insurance premium" embedded in the prod-
uct price. See note 196, infra, for an example of how sellers respond to the excessive claims
costs.
57. The provision of a warranty reduces the cost to the buyer of inspecting and negotiating
about the particulars of the product and the means of correcting defects. The warranty lowers
the transaction cost of the exchange for both the buyer and the seller. The benefits provided by
a warranty through signaling quality-related information to the buyer or as an insurance policy
from the seller to the buyer will be valued in the market and captured in the price of the product.
See infra parts II.D and II.E.
58. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 56, at 1313-14 (discussing the increased incentive not to pre-
serve health when an individual has health insurance).
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To protect against a loss (L) which has a probability (P) of occur-
ring, an individual will invest (I) no more than $I, where $I equals $L
times P (L times P is the expected value of the loss when unin-
sured).59 For instance, a building owner will spend no more than $100
to reduce by 1% the chance of a fire if the fire will cause a loss of
$10,000. However, with insurance that covers the full loss in the event
of fire, the owner has no incentive to spend $100 to avoid the loss.
Should the fire occur, the owner recovers $10,000 with or without the
precautionary expenditure of $100. From the owner's point of view,
spending the $100, when insured, is a cost which generates no benefit.
The insured's incentive is to decrease the effort spent to reduce the
probability of a loss. As a result, the loss is more likely to occur than
if there were no insurance. This is an example of the moral hazard
problem.
The inefficiency with moral hazard arises when the expenditure of
$I dollars by the insured reduces the expected value of the loss (L
times P) by more than $L It would be in society's interest to spend
the $I rather than suffer the loss, but the insured has no incentive to
make the investment. Thus, losses which could be avoided in a cost-
effective manner are not prevented. 60
The second insurance-generated problem is that of adverse selec-
tion, which arises because individuals, with the problem being insured
against, have the greatest incentive to purchase the insurance.61 The
classic example of adverse selection is medical insurance which insures
against a specific medical problem. For example, cancer insurance
will be most attractive to people who have cancer. To the extent that
the cost and availability of insurance depend on spreading the cost of
the loss, adverse selection leads to high cost and reduced availability.
With adverse selection, loss pay-outs increase and, therefore, premi-
ums must increase. The higher the premium, the less likely those with
low chances of a loss will insure. Thus, the pool of insurance buyers
becomes heavily weighted with high probability risks, and eventually
59. See generally Lutz, supra note 38 (discussing warranties and consumer loss probabilities).
60. For a discussion of how warranties generate moral hazard problems of product mainte-
nance, see id. supra note 38, at 255. The more complex moral hazard problems which can arise
when both buyers' and sellers' incentives change are considered in Russell Cooper & Thomas W.
Ross, Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard, 16 RAND J. ECON. 103, 113 (1985). For one
approach to reducing moral hazard problems which are dependent on product quality attributes,
see John Kambhu, Optimal Product Quality Under Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard,
13 BELL J. ECON. 483 (1982).
61. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechinism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 493 (1979) (describing the lemons problem and market failure).
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the insurance cost approaches the value of the loss without insurance.
If this happens, the insurance market will then fail.
One of the main causes of the adverse selection problem is asym-
metric information. Purchasers of insurance have more and better in-
formation about the likelihood of a loss than do insurers. Typically,
then, insurers can mitigate adverse selection problems by requiring
complete information from potential insureds. For example, insurers
can require disclosures of prior conditions or utilize examinations.
When asymmetric information cannot be eliminated (or reduced to a
manageable level), the market for insurance can collapse.62
For many products the problems of adverse selection and moral
hazard caused by warranty insurance will not exist.63 Enforcing an
insurance claim is expensive and time consuming and, unless the value
of the claim is large enough, a warranty claim will not arise. Thus,
there will be little reason for adverse selection and moral hazard
problems. Sellers can also reduce these problems by restricting war-
ranty terms to specific time periods, ownership conditions, and return
rules.
Nonetheless, moral hazard and adverse selection will remain
problems as long as warranty terms provide some form of insurance.
The primary difficulty which prevents avoiding these problems is in-
formational asymmetry. As long as buyers know more about a prod-
uct's use than the seller does, these inherent insurance inefficiencies
will remain. The only way to moderate them is to require full disclo-
sure of pertinent information between the buyer and the seller. When
both parties have the same relevant information, they can negotiate
appropriate insurance terms in a warranty.
E. Warranties and Buyer's Inspection
An additional consequence of providing warranty insurance is that
the buyer's incentive to perform cost-effective inspection is signifi-
cantly reduced or possibly eliminated. Except where the cost of en-
62. The classic statement of market failure due to asymmetric informational problems and a
form of adverse selection is Akerlof, supra note 61, at 500. For a general discussion of market
problems when adverse selection exists see Charles Wilson, The Nature of Equilibrium in Mar-
kets with Adverse Selection, 11 BELL J. ECON. 108, 130 (1980).
63. The extent to which the problem of adverse selection inhibits the efficient functioning of
the insurance market is considered by Georges Dionne & Neil A. Doherty, Adverse Selection,
Commitment, and Renegotiation: Extension to and Evidence From the Insurance Markets, 102 J.
POL. ECON. 209, 235 (1994). See also Robert Puelz & Arthur Snow, Evidence on Adverse Selec-
tion: Equilibrium Signaling and Cross-Subsidization in the Insurance Market, 102 J. POL. ECON.
236, 257 (1994) (noting evidence that the insurance market, under certain circumstances, can
reduce the problems arising from adverse selection).
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forcing the warranty is high, the buyer has no incentive to inspect the
product for defects. However, it is efficient for the buyer to take
those steps to inspect which are cost-effective at the time of purchase.
If buyers purchase obviously nonconforming products, transaction
costs will increase when buyers return the products and seek appropri-
ate remedies. Thus, where it is cost-effective, buyers should have the
obligation to inspect for nonconformities under a seller's warranty.64
The requirement that buyers make reasonable, cost-effective in-
spections in purchasing warranty terms ought not to be onerous in any
case. The buyer's obligation is to inspect for obvious defects or
problems-the kind of inspection which would occur in the normal
course of trading where the product is available and the buyer can
inspect. When with reasonable caution and care a buyer can avoid a
mistake or have it corrected at the time of purchase, it would be ineffi-
cient to allow the mistake or problem to remain undiscovered since
subsequent losses caused by breach of the warranty and warranty en-
forcement costs would exceed the cost of the inspection. 65 It is often
in the buyer's interest to undertake some inspection. Buyers inspect
to make sure that a product is indeed the one desired, to acquire
knowledge about the condition and attributes of complex products, to
anticipate future problems and needs, and to reduce the future ex-
pected transaction costs of exercising warranty claims. In fact, when
purchasing expensive or very complex products, consumers often em-
64. Neither UCC section 2-313 nor the case law requires a buyer to conduct a cost-effective
inspection or be barred from enforcing an express warranty with respect to nonconformities that
such an inspection would have revealed. See Overstreet v. Norden Labs., 669 F.2d 1286, 1291
(6th Cir. 1982 ) (DIcTUM); General Elec. Co. v. United States Dynamics, Inc., 403 F.2d 933, 935
(1st Cir. 1968); Interco Inc. v. Randustrial Corp., 533 S.W.2d 257, 261 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); see
also Cagney v. Cohn, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 998, 1005 (D.C. 1973) (stating that the
opportunity to inspect has no effect upon express warranty liability); Young & Cooper, Inc. v.
Vestring, 521 P.2d 281, 291 (Kan. 1974). UCC Section 2-316(3)(b) provides that, when a buyer
has examined the goods prior to entering into a contract or has refused to examine the goods,
there is no implied warranty with respect to defects that the examination ought to have revealed.
This limitation on the enforceability of an implied warranty does not impose the inspection obli-
gation advocated by this Article. Comment 8 to UCC section 2-316 and the case law make clear
that a buyer has no obligation to inspect the goods prior to purchase. Holm v. Hansen, 248
N.W.2d 503, 510 (Iowa 1976); Ambassador Steel Co. v. Ewald Steel Co., 190 N.W.2d 275 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1971). An implied warranty is excluded with respect to defects which an inspection
would have uncovered only if the buyer in fact conducted an inspection or the seller demands
that the buyer conduct an inspection which the latter fails to do. Id.
65. This inspection requirement is comparable to but exceeds that in UCC section 2-316(3).
As discussed above, although a buyer is precluded from asserting an implied warranty with re-
spect to a defect that an inspection should have revealed, UCC section 2-316 only excludes such
a warranty when the buyer in fact inspects the goods or refuses to do so after demanded by the
seller. By not requiring a cost-effective inspection under the conditions discussed above, the
UCC provides insufficient incentives for buyers to minimize the risk of defects that could be
avoided prior to purchase.
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ploy the services of experts for advice about performance, condition,
and attribute existence. 66 Since it is rational for buyers to inspect,
question, and use experts, this obligation to conduct inspections will
not be burdensome.
F Warranties and Search Costs
In addition to the insurance and risk spreading values of warranty
terms, warranties also promote an efficient allocation of resources by
reducing search costs. 67 Search costs occur when resources are used
by buyers (and sellers) to obtain information (for example about
price, location, or quality) about a product.68 The lower the search
costs, the fewer the resources needed to facilitate transactions. 69
Enforceable warranties provide information in a cost-effective man-
ner to buyers. When different sellers offer different warranty terms, a
signal is provided to buyers about differential product quality which
helps buyers distinguish each product's set of attributes from the
others.70 A warranty can also reduce the buyer's search for additional
information about product reliability and performance, since the seller
stands ready to provide a remedy for nonconforming goods. In addi-
tion, a warranty reduces the costs for buyers of searching for repair
services in the event of product failure, since the seller may agree to
provide that service.
III. PROPOSED TEST FOR EXPRESS WARRANTIES
Since the market price is an indicator of attribute existence, the
market price reflects the value of all attributes purchased by a buyer,
and it is inefficient for all buyers to engage in explicit negotiation and
66. See infra notes 131-42 and accompanying text (discussing the effect a buyer or third party
inspection on enforcement of affirmations or promises as warranties).
67. The need to expend some resources on research and information acquisition was first
analytically presented in George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECONOMY
213 (1961).
68. Search costs arise when buyers use resources to obtain information about the types, quali-
ties, and terms available on the market. The use of resources for this purpose does not result in
any more output being available to society, but only in a "better" match between buyer and
seller. To the extent the better match can be made using fewer resources, more resources will be
available for producing goods and services. Efficiency is enhanced by reduced search costs. See
NICHOLAS M. KIEFER & GEORGE R. NEUMANN, SEARCH MODELS AND APPLIED LABOR Eco-
NOMICS (Cambridge University Press, 1989).
69. Id.
70. See Evan J. Douglas et al., Warranty, Quality and Price in the U.S. Automobile Market, 25
APPLIED ECON. 135 (1993) (showing that within a particular vehicle class warranties provide a
quality signal); Esther Gal-Or, Warranties as Signal of Quality, 22 CAN. J. ECON. 50 (1989) (stat-
ing that "the provision of a warranty necessarily changes the expected desirability of the
product).
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bargaining for warranty terms and other attributes, any test for deter-
mining whether a seller affirmation or promise is an express warranty
needs to recognize the way that markets for complex products actually
operate. It would be inefficient for a test to require prior knowledge
by all buyers of all affirmations, promises, or product descriptions.71
For the purchaser of a stereo receiver, for example, the opportunity
71. The case law and commentary are divided on the question whether a buyer needs to be
aware of an affirmation, promise or description for it to be part of the basis of the bargain. For
those requiring prior knowledge, see, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3rd
Cir. 1990); Landman v. Bloomer, 23 So. 75 (Ala. 1898); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Alter, 834 S.W.2d
136 (Ark. 1992); Anderson v. Heron Eng'g. Co., 604 P.2d 674 (Colo. 1979); Schmaltz v. Nissen,
431 N.W.2d 657 (S.D. 1988); Cuthbertson v. Clark Equip. Co., 448 A.2d 315 (Me. 1982); Global
Truck & Equip. Co. Inc., v. Palmer Mach. Works Inc., 628 F. Supp. 641 (N.D. Miss. 1986); In-
terco Inc. v. Randustrial Corp., 533 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (dictum); Stang v. Hertz
Corp., 490 P.2d 475 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 340-41; Murray,
supra note 6, at 315.
For contrary authority, see Winston Indus. v. The Stuyvesant Ins. Co. Inc., 317 So. 2d 493 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1975); Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 232 A.2d 879 (N.J. 1967); Task Force of the
A.B.A. Subcommittee on General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers and Documents of Title,
Committee on the Uniform Commercial Code, An Appraisal of the March 1, 1990 Preliminary
Report of the Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 Study Group, 16 DEL_ J. CORP. L. 981, 1102
(1991) [hereinafter Appraisal]. See Adler, supra note 18, at 468-70 (noting a consumer unaware
of a representation should be entitled to it because he is paying the same price as other consum-
ers); ROBERT L. NORDSTROM, THE LAW OF SALES § 68, at 209 (1970); Sidney Kwestel, Freedom
From Reliance: A Contract Approach to Express Warranty, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 959, 976-77,
982-84 (1992) (noting in contract formation, the promisee's acceptance is effective where he
accepts an offer of an exchange of promises without knowing its terms or that the promise in-
duced the performance); Kevin Mclvers, Comment, The Meaning of "Part of the Basis of the
Bargain," 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 447, 452 (1979) (interpreting the language of UCC section
2-313 as leading to the conclusion that the drafters must have intended to leave open the possi-
bility that an express warranty could benefit a particular buyer to whom it was not personally
communicated).
The analyses which most closely resemble that in this article are those by Robert S. Adler, the
Task Force of the ABA, and the student comment. Adler and the Task Force take the position
that a person who has not seen a representation, for example in a manual accompanying a prod-
uct, should be entitled to enforce the representation since the buyer is paying the same price for
the product as others in the market. This argument appears to be made on grounds of fairness or
equal treatment for equally situated individuals and not on the market based model presented in
this Article. See Adler, supra note 18, at 468; Apraisal, supra, at 1102. More closely related to
this Article, the student author maintains that a person who has not seen a representation made
to the market as a whole should be able to enforce it as a warranty since the representation is
part of the foundation on which, or the commercial context in which, the sale is made. Mclvers,
supra, at 452,458. He does not, however, develop a comprehensive market- and efficiency-based
analysis for his thesis.
Although some courts have indicated that a buyer must know of a representation for it to be
part of the basis of the bargain, they have allowed fairly minor knowledge of the possible exist-
ence of a warranty to satisfy the knowledge requirement. See Massey-Ferguson Inc. v. Laird, 432
So. 2d 1259 (Ala. 1983) (stating that because buyer knew about express warranty prior to deliv-
ery and was familiar with the type of warranty given with such machines, the plaintiff was enti-
tled to enforce the warranty in the manual although the manual was not delivered with the
machine); Winston Indust. v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 317 So. 2d 493 (1975) (ruling that the manufac-
turer of a mobile home was liable for breach of warranties accompanying the home even though
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cost of the purchaser's time in reading and processing the information
in the warranty prior to sale compared to the expected value of the
warranty would not justify such buyer behavior. 72 It would be incor-
rect to assume that the absence of prior knowledge, inspection, or bar-
gaining implies that the buyer has received no value in exchange for
the price paid since the price reflects all the attributes embodied in the
product, known and unknown to the individual purchaser. 73
A. Terms Offered to the Market
The appropriate test for what affirmation or promise is an express
warranty is a market test. Those affirmations and promises made to
the market as a whole in the sale of a product, whether known or
bargained for by an individual buyer, are part of the product
purchased and should be treated as express warranties. The test
would ask whether for the price paid the product was offered in the
market with the seller's affirmation, promise, or description. Exist-
the buyer never received the warranty and was not aware of it; bill of sale referred to all trailers
as coming with factory warranties).
72. See Murray, supra note 6, at 322-23 (stating that if every preformation statement had to be
read or heard and every examination of a model had to be meticulous, buyers would be forced to
take extraordinary cautionary efforts before concluding sales contracts); Sovern, supra note 45,
at 36-37 (stating warranties are of little value to consumers at the time of purchase, and there-
fore the consumer has little interest in learning about warranty terms). Other than for recovery
of consequential loss, which is likely to be excluded, the expected value of a typical warranty
with a repair or replacement remedy is the cost of repairs to the product to have it conform to
the warranty multiplied by the probability that such repairs will have to be made during the
warranty period. In the stereo example posited in the text, the cost of repairs may be $100, but
the probability of product failure during the warranty period may only be 3%. In that case, the
expected value of the warranty is only $3. If it would cost the consumer more than $3 to read
and process the warranty in terms of the consumer's opportunity costs, it would be inefficient for
the consumer to read the warranty. Moreover, to the extent that it is highly likely that the
preferences of marginal buyers will be similar to the buyer's own, it is very unlikely that the
buyer would have spent any time seeking a different warranty. To the extent that the prefer-
ences of enough buyers were different from those of the buyer in question, markets would tend
to segment, with new marginal buyers having preferences closer to those of the buyer in ques-
tion, again making it inefficient to read and process the warranty terms. The fact that some
express warranties may not be highly valuable to buyers is demonstrated by Charles W. Smith-
son & Christopher R. Thomas, Measuring the Cost to Consumers of Product Defects: The Value
of "Lemon Insurance," 31 J.L. & ECON. 485 (1988). The authors concluded that the value of a
thirty-day buy-back program offered by Chrysler Corporation in the late 1970's in which
Chrysler would buy back a new car within thirty days after purchase was worth only $2 to the
marginal buyer of a compact car. Id. at 502. The buy-back program operated much as a war-
ranty of satisfaction and allowed buyers to return their vehicles for any reason.
73. For comparable analyses, see Kwestel, supra note 71, at 969; and NORDSTROM, supra note
71, at 209. For an argument that a buyer without prior knowledge of a representation should be
able to enforce it along lines of fairness and equal treatment, see Appraisal, supra note 71, at
1102 (stating that a warrantor will price its product to include the cost of warranty, and therefore
should be required to stand behind its affirmation whether the purchaser read the warranty or
not).
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ence of such a representation will be manifested in the general terms
of the market for that product, not in the reliance by any particular
buyer in any single transaction.
Under this test, affirmations or promises which are demonstrably
offered to the market as a whole,74 except as noted below, 75 will be
included as express warranties. When a seller maintains that an affir-
mation or promise is not a warranty because it was not included in the
market price, statistical tests can be used to ascertain whether the
price included a payment for the representation. 76 If it is contended
that a warranty offered to the market as a whole is not part of a partic-
ular sale, the burden is on the seller to establish that the term was not
offered to the particular buyer.77 The seller must introduce persuasive
evidence that the parties manifested assent to a bargain explicitly re-
moving the affirmation, promise or description from their deal or
proof of negotiation or special pricing to reflect the missing term.78
B. Individually Negotiated Terms-Quasi-Market
This market test applies with equal force to terms in individually
negotiated or singular transactions unless those terms are idiosyn-
cratic in character. A seller may have only one good for sale, e.g., an
74. Whether an affirmation or promise is offered to the market as a whole or only to a limited
group of buyers must be decided by the trier of fact.
75. The basic exceptions are due to inspection, and for some false statements. See infra notes
131-45 and accompanying text (discussing inspection) and notes 172-86 and accompanying text
(discussing misrepresentation exceptions).
76. Methods for statistical tests of the hedonic price model are identified in Sherwin Rosen,
supra note 36. For examples of the use of statistical methods, see Timothy J. Bartik, The Estima-
tion of Demand Parameters in Hedonic Price Models, 95 J. POi ECON. 81 (1987) (noting an
alternative instrumental variable approach can be used to determine effects of variables on other
variables (such as the effect of changes in income on household budget restraints)).
77. If the buyer establishes that an affirmation or promise was made to the market as a whole,
the seller than needs to prove that the affirmation or promise was not part of this particular deal.
The burden is on the seller since ordinarily the affirmation or promise will be included in the
price. Therefore, the burden is on the seller to prove that the buyer paid a discount price exclud-
ing the affirmation or promise from the deal.
78. See St. Charles Cable TV, Inc. v. Eagle Comtronics, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 820, 829 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (presenting dictum that representation claiming descramblers would have less than a 4%
failure rate could not have been part of the basis of the bargain because the plaintiff extracted
substantial price concessions from the defendant based on the experimental nature of the goods;
guarantee would have been contrary to the realities with respect to the then state of the art and
the prototype being produced by the defendant); Alan Wood Steel Co. v. Capital Equip. Enter.,
Inc., 349 N.E.2d 627 (II1. App. Ct. 1976) (purchasing at inordinately low price demonstrated that
representation was not part of the basis of the bargain because the buyer was not relying);
NORDSTROM, supra note 71, at 212 (stating the best single indicator of the basis of the bargain is
the price paid-full price would indicate seller's statements were part of the basis of the bargain
while any price less may indicate that the parties were exchanging the risk that the goods would
be faulty for a lower price).
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automobile. He may make a number of representations about the
good, either in pre-sale literature, such as a newspaper advertisement,
in pre-sale discussions with the buyer, or in the writing embodying the
contract between the parties. Although the seller's representations
pertain to only one good and ultimately can be enforceable by one
buyer, that does not mean that all the representations are idiosyn-
cratic. To be idiosyncratic, the representations must be of a character
that is not valuable to the market as a whole but only to the particular
buyer. Probably most of the representations about a good would be
ones that the seller would make to any buyer in the market and would
be representations that any buyer would value. With respect to these
representations, all that should be required for a representation to be
an express warranty is that the seller have made the affirmation or
promise.
C. Idiosyncratic Terms-Non-Market
An idiosyncratic or non-market representation, on the other hand,
is presumed to be part of the agreement of the parties and a warranty
only if there is negotiation between the parties concerning the terms
to a sale or there is an explicit affirmation or promise by a seller and
reliance by a buyer.79 Unless one of these requirements is met, sub-
stantial error costs will exist in the enforcement of representations
that in fact were not made.8 0
This presumptive market test is consistent with how modem mar-
kets provide products for buyers. This test will promote market effi-
ciency by reducing transaction, search, and information costs. Finally,
this test will provide incentives for sellers to create the optimal terms
and attributes for products while also providing incentives for both
buyers and sellers to correct misinformation in a cost-effective
manner.
79. The existence of a representation, even in this case of an idiosyncratic representation, does
not depend on the use of an expert opinion or inspection. For the role of experts and buyer
inspection, see infra text accompanying notes 131-44.
80. Since an idiosyncratic representation is uniquely valuable to a particular buyer, it is un-
likely that the seller will offer it to the market as a whole. The buyer, having better information
about his or her idiosyncratic preferences, is more likely to reveal his or her preferences to the
seller since it is cheaper than having the seller discover them. See infra note 125. As a result, it
is likely that the buyer will initiate bargaining with respect to a term by at least bringing the
preference or representation to the seller's attention. Moreover, if the representation is
uniquely valuable to a buyer, it is probable that the buyer will expend resources for it and rely on
its presence in the transaction with the seller. Otherwise, the representation would not be in-
cluded in the deal. Therefore, if the elements of negotiation or seller affirmation or promise and
buyer reliance are absent from a transaction, it is more likely than not that the seller did not
make the representation.
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IV. APPLYING THE PROPOSED EXPRESS WARRANTY TEST
The market provides strong incentives to create, in a cost-effective
manner, products which have terms and other attributes desired by
consumers and profitable to sellers. In this section, this Article, con-
siders whether the market will provide appropriate warranties to the
market in general and, thus, have the value of such warranties in-
cluded in the market price. This section also examines how market
discipline and a market based test for express warranties will improve
the allocation of resources. In the following sections, this Article ap-
plies this test for express warranties in particular situations.
A. Prepurchase Claims Made to the Market in General
Despite the analysis about the manner in which markets create at-
tributes including express warranties, some courts have refused to en-
force affirmations or promises of which the buyer was unaware. 81 In
dictum, the court in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.82 rejected a trial
court's instruction that a cigarette manufacturer could be held to have
made an express warranty in commercials proclaiming the safety of its
cigarettes if the representation would naturally induce a purchase of
its product even if the individual buyer seeking to recover under the
representation did not rely on it.83 The court stated:
Under the extreme version of this theory [that the objective mani-
festations of the parties determine what is part of the bargain] ... all
the buyer should have to show is what the seller agreed to sell. In
other words, an express warranty would be created when a seller
makes statements to the public at large that would induce a reason-
able buyer to purchase the product, even if the actual buyer never
heard those statements. We find this result untenable, however....
[T]his interpretation drains all substantive meaning from the phrase
'basis of the bargain,' and would allow a seller [sic: buyer] to collect
even if that seller [sic: buyer] was unaware of the warranty until she
walked into her attorney's office to file suit.84
As our analysis of how markets function in determining the content
of product attributes indicates, the court's conclusion is faulty. A
81. For examples of courts adopting this position see, Dilenno v. Libbey Glass Division,
Owens-Illinois, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 373 (D. Del. 1987); Global Truck & Equip. Co., Inc., v. Palmer
Mach. Works, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 641 (N.D. Miss. 1986); Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339
F. Supp. 676 (D. N.H. 1972); Landman v. Bloomer, 23 So. 75 (Ala. 1898); Anderson v. Herron
Eng'g Co., Inc., 604 P.2d 674 (Colo. 1979); Cuthbertson v. Clark Equip. Co., 448 A.2d 315 (Me.
1982); Interco, Inc. v. Randustrial Corp., 533 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (dictum); Stang v.
Hertz Corp., 490 P.2d 475 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971).
82. Cippollone v. Liggett Croup, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 566-67 (3rd Cir. 1990).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 568.
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promise or affirmation may be a part of the basis of the bargain for
which the buyer has paid the price even if he or she is unaware of it.85
It is the market that determines the'attributes of the underlying trans-
action regardless of the knowledge or ignorance of those attributes by
the buyer, and the buyer should have a legally enforceable right to
those attributes.
The court's reasoning is consistent with the bargain theory of con-
tracts which requires that a promisee be aware of a promise before the
promisee's promise or performance can be given in exchange for the
promise.86 For example, a person who performs the conduct for which
an offer of reward is made cannot enforce the offer if he or she does
not know of the reward prior to or while engaging in the conduct.87
The refusal to enforce the offeror's promise when the performing
party is unaware of it can be justified on the ground that such enforce-
ment is not necessary to facilitate a wealth maximizing exchange since
there is no exchange of the performing party's conduct for the prom-
isor's offer.88 However, imposing a knowledge requirement is ineffi-
cient and unnecessary, for terms such as warranties which are made to
85. The court in Cipollone held that an affirmation or promise is presumed to be part of the
basis of the bargain if the buyer has become aware of it, unless the seller proves that the buyer
knew the representation was untrue. Id. The court added that if the seller proves that the buyer
disbelieved the affirmation or promise, the buyer could still enforce the representation as a war-
ranty if the buyer could prove that she nevertheless relied on the representation. Id. at n.31.
86. E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACrS § 2.10 (2d ed. 1990). As the author indicates, the
law tends to deal with this issue under the requirement of mutual assent although it also bears on
whether there is consideration, i.e., a bargained-for exchange. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CoRAcrTs § 23 cmt. c (1979) (stating that a person who acts without knowledge of an offer is
not within the offer's terms).
87. See Sumerel v. Pinder, 83 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1955) (stating that where information was given
to police before the reward was made, there was no acceptance of an offer that would give rise to
a contract); Alexander v. Russo, 571 P. 2d 350 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979) (noting it would be contrary
to public policy and unconscionable to permit the mother of a thief to collect the reward for
stolen goods where the mother gave the information about the stolen goods without knowledge
of the reward and after several months of having such knowledge); Broadnax v. Ledbetter, 99
S.W. 1111 (Tex. 1907) (ruling that the knowledge of the reward prior to recapturing a prisoner
was essential in order to collect the reward). For cases holding that prior knowledge of a reward
is immaterial to entitlement, see Sullivan v. Phillips, 98 N.E. 868 (Ind. 1912); Dawkins v. Sap-
pington, 26 Ind. 199 (1866). The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that an offeree can
accept such an offer if the person learns of the offer prior to performing all of the conduct
bargained for by the offeror. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 51 (1979).
88. The traditional basis for differential treatment of bargained for promises, which are en-
forced, and gratuitous promises, which generally are not enforced, is that the former produce
wealth by facilitating the exchange of goods or services to a higher use while the latter are mere
"sterile" representations. See JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 5 (1990)
(noting economic exchange increases individual values and the value of the resources of society);
Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 799, 815 (1941) (stating that while an
exchange of goods conduces to the production of wealth, a gift is a "sterile transmission"). The
characterization of gratuitous promises as being nonwealth producing is criticized in Andrew
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the market should protect the buyer who knows he is entering into a
bargain where he is unaware of all its terms. In such a circumstance
there is a wealth maximizing exchange that the law should enforce,
and a knowledge rule increases the costs of that exchange. As dis-
cussed earlier, requiring ex ante knowledge of all the terms offered to
the market imposes inefficient search costs.89 A buyer may value a
representation made to the market in the sense of being willing to pay
for it, but the search costs to discover and process the representation
may cause the buyer's total costs to exceed that value. Therefore, to
reduce these transaction costs and maximize the value of the transac-
tion to both the seller and the buyer, the representation to the market
should be enforceable by the buyer without prior knowledge of the
representation's existence or characteristics. 90
The only argument for denying enforcement of an affirmation or
promise by a buyer ignorant of its existence is that the buyer may not
have valued the representation at the time of purchase. The buyer
may have been willing to purchase the product at the seller's price
without the warranty. Refusal to enforce a representation when a
buyer does not value it would be consistent with a theory of consider-
ation that required a promisee's performance or promise in fact be
induced by a promisor's promise.91 When a promisee is indifferent
about a promisor's promise, theoretically there is no wealth maximiz-
Kull, Reconsidering Gratuitous Promises, 21 J. LEGAL SrD. 39 (1992); Richard A. Posner, Gra-
tuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STu. 411 (1977).
89. See supra text accompanying note 72 (stating that because a warranty may be of little
value to the purchaser at the time of purchase, it would be inefficient to require knowledge of all
terms prior to purchase).
90. A comparable issue is presented by cases dealing with whether employees can enforce the
terms in an employer's manual if the employee is unfamiliar with the terms. For cases holding
that an employee need not be aware of such terms, see Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,
292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980); Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1985).
For a case to the contrary, see Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).
91. According to respected authority, a desire to receive the return performance or promise
need not be the motive for entering into a bargain. WALTER H. JAEGER, WILLISTON ON CON-
TRACTS § 111 (3d ed. 1957). Similarly, the motive or cause for in entering into a contract is
irrelevant to the existence of consideration and gives the following illustration:
A wishes to make a binding promise to his son B to convey to B Blackacre, which is
worth $5,000. Being advised that a gratuitous promise is not binding, A writes to B an
offer to sell Blackacre for $1. B accepts. B's promise to pay $1 is sufficient
consideration.
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 84(a) cmt. b (1932).
Without expressly citing this illustration, Section 79, Comment d, to the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts rejects such "sham" transactions as being enforceable. According to the Comment,
the $1 is a mere pretense or formality and not consideration for the father's promise since it was
not bargained for. Id. The Restatement deals with motive and inducing cause in Section 81:
(1) The fact that what is bargained for does not of itself induce the making of a promise
does not prevent it from being consideration for the promise.
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ing bargained-for exchange and therefore no basis to enforce the
promisor's promise. The problem with that argument as applied to
prepurchase claims made to the market is that a seller's promise or
affirmation is part of an exchange, not an isolated gratuitous promise,
and allowing an inquiry into whether a buyer valued a representation
prior to purchasing a product would undermine the value of the repre-
sentation as a warranty.
Although the doctrine of consideration purports to focus on the re-
ciprocal inducement of a promise for a promise or a promise for a
performance, 92 the law, as in the area of the mutual assent,93 is con-
cerned with the external manifestation of a bargain rather than the
subjective states of minds of the parties or their subjective knowledge
of all the terms of the proposed bargain. 94 The law examines the out-
ward manifestations of the parties rather than their subjective states
of mind because the latter are so costly and difficult to ascertain, the
parties frequently have mixed motives or incentives in making a
promise or rendering a performance, 95 and an examination of subjec-
tive motives would generate substantial uncertainty costs about the
enforcement of promises when promisors perceived that they had
some vehicle for escaping a disadvantageous transaction.
Thus, unless there is a mere pretense of a bargain, for example,
where a father promises to purchase a broken toy from his son for one
million dollars a year for ten years to avoid gift or estate taxes, the law
will not inquire into subjective states of minds of the parties.96 In
many instances, although a buyer may subjectively be unaware of a
promise in the overall bargain, the buyer is giving his promise or the
price in exchange for all the terms in the bargain and seeks whatever
promises are made, both known and unknown.97 If a seller were al-
lowed to challenge the value the buyer attached to a representation of
(2) The fact that a promise does not of itself induce a performance or return promise
does not prevent the performance or return promise from being consideration for the
promise.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 81 (1979) (emphasis added).
92. Id. § 71.
93. FARNSWORTH, supra, note 86, § 3.6.
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 cmt. b (1979).
95. ARTHUR L. CORBIN, 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 58, at 244 (1963).
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS §§ 71 cmt. b & 81 cmt. b (1979); Kwestel, supra
note 71, at 986-87.
97. Kwestel makes a comparable argument that the representation should be enforceable be-
cause the buyer is paying for all, not some, of the seller's representations. Kwestel, supra note
71, at 969. His argument differs from this Article's in that it appears in part to be based on
grounds of fairness to the buyer and not a market based theory for how warranties are created.
Id.
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which the buyer was unaware, it would be difficult, if not impossible,
for the buyer to prove that he attached any value to the claim.
B. Terms Not Seen Before the Sale
Closely associated to unseen prepurchase affirmations or promises
of which a particular buyer is unaware are representations that are
contained in manuals or brochures accompanying a product (perhaps
some of which are enclosed in the container for the product) and are
not read by the buyer until after the purchase. The representation
may involve an item about which very few buyers are aware prior to
purchasing the product. A simple example is an automobile manual
that describes all the functions and methods of operating a stereo re-
ceiver with a CD player that comes with the car. The question arises
whether a buyer should be able to enforce a representation in the
manual as to how the receiver should operate or the number of fea-
tures it possesses if the buyer has not read the manual until after
purchasing the car. 98
If a purchaser is physically injured by relying on a false representa-
tion, he may be able to recover in tort law.99 If, however, the product
simply does not operate in the manner specified in the manual or
brochure or lacks one of the attributes mentioned therein, resolution
of the question whether the representation should be treated as an
express warranty is more difficult. The answer depends on two issues:
first, whether the market operates to include the claim, even though
unseen, as part of the price for which the buyer has paid;100 second,
98. See Global Truck & Equip. Co. v. Palmer Mach. Works, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 641 (N.D. Miss.
1986) (holding a purchaser who did not receive a brochure before purchasing the truck could not
enforce the brochure's representations that a truck could handle all kinds of soil). Compare
Cuthbertson v. Clark Equip. Co., 448 A.2d 315 (Me. 1982) (holding that employee killed when
front loader tipped over could not sue for breach of warranty in manual employer had not read)
with Daughtrey v. Ashe, 413 S.E.2d 336 (Va. 1992) (holding that buyer entitled to enforce repre-
sentations concerning bracelet in box containing same); and Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Laird, 432
So. 2d 1259 (Ala. 1983) (holding that plaintiff entitled to enforce warranty in manual not deliv-
ered with combine since warranty was discussed at time of sale and the plaintiff was familiar with
the type of warranty given with such machines). For commentators maintaining that a buyer
should be able to enforce the representation in a manual which he has received but not read, see
Kwestel, supra note 71, at 1011; Murray, supra note 6, at 322-23.
99. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965) (providing general rule that seller
strictly liable for misrepresentation about product characteristic that causes physical harm to
consumer who justifiably relies on representation); DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., PROSSER AND KEE-
TON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 105 (1984) (discussing misrepresentation generally).
100. The evidence is that markets do price attribute terms, including warranty terms and fea-
tures. See Jennifer L. Gerner & W. Keith Bryant Appliance Warranties as a Market Signal, 15 J.
CONSUMER AiF. 75-86 (1981) (finding that the market for household appliances did offer a
variety, and changing set, of warranty terms). They also found that the value of warranty terms
responded to changing market conditions. Jennifer L. Gerner & W. Keith Bryant, The Price of a
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whether efficiency is enhanced by enforcing the representation with-
out the buyer having been aware of it prior to purchase.' 0'
1. Inexpensive or Repeat Purchase Products
Resolving the first issue is not difficult for relatively inexpensive
items which are purchased on a repeat basis. Here, to retain the good-
will of repeat purchasers, the seller will have to provide the terms that
buyers prefer, including the terms in manuals which they do not read
until they operate or assemble the product. If a seller fails to include
terms that buyers prefer, buyers will move to other sellers who will
provide the terms in a cost-effective manner. Failure to provide the
desired terms will either drive the seller out of the market or reduce
the seller's price. Thus, sellers will expect the terms to be enforced
and offer only those terms that are cost-effective and valued by
buyers.
2. Expensive or Infrequently Purchased Products
With respect to durable goods or goods that are purchased on a less
frequent basis, mechanisms other than repeat purchases come into
play to determine the contents and commitments in the manual or the
product's price. First, even for these goods there is a concern about
repeat sales. The buyer who has purchased one make of automobile,
for example, may not make a subsequent purchase if the seller failed
to provide warranty terms he or she preferred or if the representations
that accompanied the original purchase proved to be untrue and the
purchaser suffered "buyer's remorse." This same argument holds in
instances where sellers offer a variety of items (e.g., department or
appliance specialty stores) to the market: sellers will value the return
of consumers to purchase additional or different goods. Anticipating
that a buyer may not return for subsequent purchases if the state-
ments in the manual are ones which the buyer does not prefer or are
incorrect, the seller has a strong incentive to include correct informa-
tion and warranty terms so as to maximize its return from repeat or
return purchases. 102
Warranty: The Case for Refrigerators, 12 J. CONSUMER Ai'. 30, 47 (1978). Robert E. Wilkes and
James B. Wilcox found that more than one-half (58%) of those interviewed (235 respondents)
knew about the warranty terms for items that they purchased, although a minority were aware of
the details of the warranty provisions. Consumer Perceptions of Product Warranties and Their
Implications for Retail Strategy, 4 J. Bus. RES. 35-43 (1976).
101. See supra notes 71-72 (discussing whether a buyer needs to be aware of an affirmation to
be part of the basis of the bargain).
102. There are of course "fly-by-night" operations which do not expect or depend on repeat
purchases. Moreover, there are some product attributes, known as credence attributes, with
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Second, in addition to maintaining its return from repeat purchases,
a seller has an incentive to provide correct information and desired
terms to create goodwill value and enhanced reputation. Word of
mouth among purchasers can result in other potential buyers not
purchasing a product if one buyer does not receive accurate informa-
tion or sufficient commitments from a manual and transmits that fact
to other potential purchasers. Consumer advocacy groups and media
reports also discipline seller behavior where reputation is valuable. 0 3
Third, some buyers will rely on third party sources of information,
such as Consumer Reports.10 4 These sources provide independent ver-
ification of the content and truthfulness of representations in a man-
ual. Consumers rely on such third party sources prior to making a
purchase involving a high cost and extreme dissatisfaction if the prod-
uct fails to perform up to expectations or representations. l0 5
respect to which the seller has no incentive to tell the truth since buyers simply must trust the
seller that such attributes exist. See Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the
Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 69 (1973) (stating that credence qualities are
expensive to judge and arise whenever a good is used with other goods of uncertain properties);
Ellen R. Jordan & Paul H. Rubin, An Economic Analysis of the Law of False Advertising, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 527, 530-31 (1979) (arguing that credence qualities cannot be monitored by the
nonexpert, even after consumption, and therefore the purchaser must rely on the seller). The
assumption of this Article is that the attributes to which the representations pertain are either
search attributes, i.e., ones whose existence the buyer can ascertain prior to purchase, or experi-
ence attributes, i.e., ones whose existence a buyer can ascertain through experience.
103. For the influence of consumer advocacy groups on product attributes, see John M.
Church, A Market Solution to Green Marketing: Some Lessons for the Economics of lnfbrma-
tion, 79 MINN. L. REV. 245, 256 & n.33 (1994) (commenting on the marketing of "green" claims
and on the influence of advocacy groups in causing a fastfood chain to alter its packaging materi-
als). For a minor sampling of media reports on automobile attributes, see Brake Probe Spreads
to GMC Suburbans, COM. APPEAL, Oct. 27, 1995, at 5B; Chrysler Gets New Warning on
Minivans, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1995, at 25; Crash Test Tapes To Be Aired Soon, Agency Says;
Consultant: They Reveal Chrysler Minivan's Danger, POsT-DIsPATCH (St. Louis), Aug. 29, 1995,
at 5A; Faulty Latch Suspected in Fatal Van Crash, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 27, 1995, at A2; GM's
Anti-Lock Brakes Spark 5,600 Complaints, RECORD, Sept. 27, 1995, at A15; Minivan Owners Get
Mixed Signals About Safety, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 1995, at B1; Study: Anti-Lock Brakes Aren't
Saving More Lives, POST-DISPATCH (St. Louis), Feb. 7, 1996, at 1C; Video Shows Danger of
Chrysler Van Latches, REC., Oct. 26, 1995, at A18.
104. See Sharon E. Beaty & Scott Smith, External Search Effort: An Investigation Across Sev-
eral Product Categories, 14 J. CONSUMER RES. 83, 90 (1987) (citing findings which showed that
people tended to use neutral sources, such as Consumer Reports; with more expensive
purchases); see also CONSUMER REP. BuyING GUIDE 1996, 30-32 (commenting on audio produc-
tion and enhancement of television sets)); CONSUMER REP., May 1995, at 357 (specifying con-
venience devices on clothes dryers).
105. See Michael J. Houston, Consumer Evaluations of Product Information Sources, in CUR-
RENT ISSUES AND RESEARCH IN ADVERTISING 135, 140 (James H. Leigh & Claude R. Martin Jr.
eds., 1979) (suggesting a likely pattern for consumers' usage of third parties as sources of infor-
mation includes reference to other persons and product rating publications to discover product
attributes such as dealer reputation, durability, and price); William B. Locander & Peter W.
Hermann, The Effect of Self-Confidence and Anxiety on Information Seeking in Consumer Risk
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Finally, if a statement provided in such a manual is incorrect, a
seller is likely to incur avoidable administrative costs. It will have to
deal with disgruntled customers, who may lack a legally enforceable
warranty claim, but who will nevertheless complain to the seller if the
good failed to conform to a representation in the manual. Buyers will
learn of incorrect promises and affirmations through word-of-mouth,
consumer advocacy groups, and/or third party purveyors of consumer
information. If statements about product attributes in a manual are
found to be inaccurate, buyers will treat their value as approaching
zero and reduce the market price at which they will buy the product.
Buyers who value the attributes sufficiently will procure the attributes
from an after-market source, such as a specialty store that sells auto-
mobile stereo equipment.
Therefore, third-party verification, word-of-mouth information, and
the value of seller reputation provide substantial incentives for sellers
to include accurate representations that buyers prefer in the manuals
they provide. Thus, it is rational for buyers to assume that they are
purchasing accurate and preferred information and commitments as
part of their underlying deal and for third parties to verify the accu-
racy of promises and affirmations made by sellers.
3. Efficiency and Prepurchase Knowledge
The above analysis demonstrates that seller affirmations in a man-
ual or brochure accompanying a product are likely to be included in
the price and, for present purposes, to be the kind of terms that buyers
prefer. The latter is extremely important to the question of whether a
buyer should have prepurchase knowledge of such affirmations or
promises to be able to enforce them as warranties. Since it is highly
likely that such representations represent buyer preferences, there is
little value in buyers examining the claims prior to purchase to deter-
mine whether that is the case. Moreover, as demonstrated previously,
the ex ante expected value of many warranties, including some for
durables, is not very high. 106 Given the high probability that a repre-
sentation will reflect consumer preferences and that it might not have
a high expected value, it is not efficient for consumers to expend sub-
stantial resources to determine the existence and content of the repre-
sentation prior to purchase. The cost of conducting a prepurchase
Reduction, 16 J. MARKETINo RES. 268, 273 (1979) (theorizing that specific self-confidence has a
significant impact on information seeking: the higher a consumers self-confidence, the greater
the tendency to seek information sources as the complexity of the product rises).
106. See supra note 72 (noting that product warranties may be of little value to the consumer
at the time of purchase).
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investigation of a warranty's terms may be increased by its location in
a box containing the product and/or in a manual that is many pages in
length.107 Therefore, it is rational economic behavior not to find and
investigate the warranty terms prior to purchase.
As with unknown prepurchase affirmations or promises, it might be
maintained that a purchaser unaware of a claim may not have valued
the seller's representation and therefore theoretically did not bargain
for it.108 This argument falters because buyers are likely to anticipate
the presence of manuals containing affirmations or promises constitut-
ing warranties whether or not they know in fact about their existence
in the particular transaction given the frequency with which such
manuals accompany such products. As a result, it is much more likely
that the buyer gives his promise or the price in exchange for all terms
and product attributes, both known and unknown. It is less likely that
the buyer is indifferent about an affirmation or promise based solely
on his unawareness that it exists in the particular transaction.
C. Warranties Contained in Express Contracts
So far the discussion for enforcing promises, affirmations, or de-
scriptions as warranty terms priced in the market has related to repre-
sentations in communications such as advertising and brochures and
in documents accompanying a sale such as a manufacturer's manual
for the product. In a number of those instances, the affirmation or
promise was contained in a communication from a remote manufac-
turer with whom the buyer lacked privity of contract. 109 The question
107. To increase the presale availability of warranties on consumer products, the Magnuson-
Moss Act provides that the Federal Trade Commission shall adopt rules "requiring that the
terms of any written warranty on a consumer product be made available to the consumer prior
to the sale of the product to him." 15 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)(A) (1994). Pursuant to the statute, the
Federal Trade Commission has adopted a rule requiring presale availability of Magnuson-Moss
written warranties. 16 C.F.R. § 702 (1993). Under the rule, a warrantor such as a manufacturer
must provide a seller with warranty information in one of several alternative manners. 16 C.F.R.
§ 702.3(b). The seller is then obligated to furnish the information to consumers. 16 C.F.R.
§ 702.3(a). One of the most common ways for sellers to comply with the rule is to post signs,
either in the store or in a department, calling attention to the fact that warranties are available
on request and then maintaining a binder with warrantor warranties. CLARK & SMrr-, supra
note 12, § 18.02[2]. Although this warranty information reduces consumers' search costs, con-
sumers still must engage in somewhat costly presale search behavior to utilize it. Moreover, the
statute and Federal Trade Commission Rule are limited to Magnuson-Moss written warranties,
warranties that are not given on many products, including consumer products. 16 C.F.R. § 702.1
(c).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 86-91 (discussing the argument that because the buyer
was unaware of the promise, the buyer did not bargain for it).
109. See, e.g., Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 566-67 (3rd Cir. 1990) (consid-
ering a suit by a remote buyer against a cigarette manufacturer based on claims made in its
advertisements).
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presented here is the basis for enforcing contractual representations
where the buyer and seller are in privity of contract.
1. Standard Form Written Contracts
When an express representation is contained in a standard form
contract used either by all or many sellers within an industry or only
by a particular seller, 110 the affirmations or promises contained
therein should be enforceable so long as the buyer has manifested as-
sent to the writing, generally by signing it, whether or not the buyer is
aware of the representation and whether or not he or she valued the
representation."' Part of the rationale for this position is based on
our earlier discussion of how markets generate product attributes." 2
In the case of a standard form contract, the terms are produced by the
interaction of sellers and marginal buyers attempting to maximize net
revenues to the former and value to the latter." 3 A seller seeking to
maximize net revenue will include in the standard form those terms
that are necessary to attract sufficient buyers so that the seller will sell
an optimal quantity of goods, a quantity at which the seller's marginal
revenue equals marginal cost.1 14 To obtain this objective and provide
for rules governing the sale, the seller will include various terms, some
of which may be known by and very important to only some of the
buyers in the market. As a result, a buyer who manifests assent to a
standard form may attach no value to an express affirmation or prom-
110. The standard form used by an individual seller will reflect the interaction that it has with
marginal buyers in attempting to maximize its net income. A seller may include terms different
from others in the same industry to provide market segmentation and attract buyers whom it
thinks prefer different terms from those offered by others in the industry or due to cost
differences.
111. See Kwestel, supra note 71 at 982-84 (arguing that buyer who does not value an affirma-
tion or promise should be able to enforce the representation because it is part of the price that
he paid the seller and because the common law of contracts does not require that a promisor in a
bilateral contract demonstrate that he was motivated by one part of the other party's promise in
making a bargained for exchange).
112. See supra notes 24-40 and accompanying text (discussing product attributes).
113. See supra notes 28-30, 36-45 and accompanying text (noting markets establish a product's
attributes by maximizing the utility to the buyer and the value received by the seller). But cf
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960) (holding disclaimer of warranty
and limitation of liability unenforceable as contrary to public policy); Freidrich Kessler, Con-
tracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632,
640 (1943) (stating that standard contracts in the hands of powerful industries and commercial
overlords empower them to deviate terms and impose a new feudal order); David W. Slawson,
Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529
(1971) (reasoning that because standard form contracts are imposed rather agreed upon, they
are universally unfair; to restore fairness, terms should be controlled by standards derived from
parties' conduct and equity).
114. See ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 135-47 (1995).
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ise in a standard form. Nonetheless, he or she should be able to en-
force the representation since it is part of the bundle of attributes that
was purchased. Similarly, a buyer may not have negotiated the terms
of a standard form or read its terms. Nevertheless, the buyer should
be able to enforce the terms for the reason just articulated.
As in the case of prepurchase representations or those contained in
documents or manuals accompanying products, the promises or affir-
mations in standard form contracts should be enforceable even if a
purchaser is unaware of a representation because the transaction costs
for each buyer to negotiate such terms individually or even learn of
their existence would be excessive in relationship to their value."15
Although the representations are contained in a writing which may
obviously be contractual in nature, the costs of discovering, reading
and processing the writing's terms may be quite high." 6 Such docu-
ments may be long and dense and contain verbiage that is difficult for
some people to comprehend. 117 Given the fact that the affirmations
or promises made in such documents are likely to reflect buyer prefer-
ences," 8 there is little value in a particular buyer examining and
processing the seller's affirmations or promises.
As with previously discussed representations, there is some likeli-
hood that enforcing affirmations or promises in favor of buyers who
are unaware of their existence will result in some buyers being able to
enforce terms to which they might have been indifferent.' 19 Again, it
might be asserted that such buyers did not bargain for the sellers'
promises, negating the theoretical basis for consideration. 20 The ob-
jection to such an assertion is stronger here than for affirmations or
115. See supra text accompanying note 72 (reasoning that because some warranties are of
little value to consumers at the time of purchase, it is not economically efficient to require bar-
gaining or inspection prior to sale).
116. See supra text and note 72 (discussing bargaining for warranties).
117. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 86, § 4.26 (noting the use of fine print and convoluted
clauses). For legislative responses to such contracts in consumer settings, see CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 42-152 (West 1992) (requiring that every consumer contract shall be written in plain
language); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1124 (West 1980 & Supp. 1994) (requiring every writ-
ten agreement to be in a clear and coherent manner); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702 (McKin-
ney 1989) (providing that contracts must be written in a clear and coherent manner using words
with common and every day meanings).
118. To the extent that the preferences of marginal buyers differed from those of other buyers,
a market opportunity would exist for sellers to offer different warranties to capture that portion
of the market. See Holdych & Ferrell, supra note 29, at 254-55.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 91 and 108 (stating that if a buyer is unaware of a
promise, there is theoretically no bargained for exchange and therefore no basis to enforce the
promise).
120. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing the theory of consideration which
requires that a promisee's performance is in fact induced by a promisor's promise).
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promises made in other contexts. The buyer who purchases a product
pursuant to a standard form contract, which he does not read, clearly
understands that he is purchasing or making an obligation to purchase
and assumes that his price is being given for whatever terms the writ-
ing contains. The purchaser knows he is unaware of contract terms
that may be favorable to him and believes that he is paying for all the
terms in the writing, both known and unknown. As a result, it is diffi-
cult to say that the buyer is not paying or bargaining for unknown
terms. Moreover, proving that a buyer either would or would not
have valued a warranty had he known about it would be difficult, re-
quiring much subjective evidence, and would undermine the value of
such terms.' 2' Therefore, a buyer who is unaware of affirmations or
promises in the standard form should be able to enforce them as
warranties.
The only instance in which the standard form warranty should not
be enforceable by the buyer is when there is evidence that the buyer
manifested assent or negotiated to remove the term from the contract
which will be evidenced in many transactions by a price reduction
from that at which the product is generally sold.122
2. Nonstandard Form Written and Oral Contracts
Perhaps the transaction for which one might question application of
our market based test for express warranties is one involving a non-
standard form written or oral contract. The initial reaction is to con-
clude that, because of the individually negotiated character of the
transaction, the contract is one for which the buyer should have to
prove that she knew of, negotiated for, or relied on an affirmation or
promise for it to be enforceable. This reaction is based on the as-
sumption that, unless the buyer had this knowledge or negotiated for
121. This analysis is not intended to preclude the possible unenforceability of a term adverse
to a buyer that he or she had no reason to believe might be included in an agreement. The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 211 provides that a term is not part of a standardized
agreement if one party to the agreement had reason to know that the other party would not
manifest assent to the agreement if he or she knew the term was part of the agreement. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1979); see also U.C.C. § 2-606(b) (Tentative Draft,
Jan. 1996) (providing that, absent express agreement, a consumer is not bound by a term in a
standard form to which the consumer assented if the consumer could not reasonably have ex-
pected the term to be in the agreement). Section 211 of the Restatement does not, however,
apply to affirmations and promises in written sales contracts, both because buyers expect such
terms in the writings and because the terms are not oppressive or adverse to their interests.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1979).
122. See supra text accompanying note 78 (requiring evidence of negotiation or special pricing
to remove market representations from the deal).
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the term, it could not have been part of the parties' agreement or in-
cluded in the contract's price. These assumptions are false.
When a seller prepares the terms of a nonstandard form contract,123
he must determine what terms are going to maximize the value of the
sale. 124 Unless the seller has some ex ante reason to believe that the
buyer has preferences with respect to his product different from those
of other potential buyers in the market, he will offer terms that would
be acceptable to buyers generally and not simply to those with idio-
syncratic tastes. 25 The reason he will do so is twofold, to reduce
transaction costs in putting the deal together 126 and to maximize the
return on the transaction. 27 If the seller believes that the buyer, and
the market in general, values an enforceable warranty for his product
and the price the buyer is willing to pay is higher than his cost of
providing the warranty, he will offer a warranty. 28 If not, he will not.
Failure to include a warranty for which the buyer would be willing to
pay more than the seller's cost would result in a less than optimal sale
for the seller. Accordingly, the seller will include the price of the war-
ranty in his product price and include the term in the contract with the
buyer even without the latter's ex ante knowledge or negotiation.
123. Of course it is possible for the buyer to prepare the terms of sale. Then the seller simply
adopts the buyer's affirmations or promises as his own.
124. The optimal contract is one that maximizes the value of both parties to the transaction.
Of course a seller may attempt to capture part of the gain that would be created for the buyer
under such a transaction. Even if that is true in some transactions, it does not affect this analysis
because this Article is dealing with situations in which the seller has included an affirmation or
promise even if the seller's predominant motive is to increase its gain by increasing the price at
which it will be able to sell the product. To accomplish that objective, the affirmation or promise
must be valued by and beneficial to a prospective buyer.
125. The seller will probably not offer terms that appeal to a buyer's idiosyncratic tastes since
it is cheaper for the buyer who knows those tastes to reveal them than for the seller to discover
them.
126. Some might question whether a seller would offer a warranty initially or wait to include it
in later negotiations with a buyer. Although a seller might engage in this latter behavior, that is
not the question presented in the text. There the question is why the seller will include the
representation in the contract, either prior to or after negotiation with a buyer, and whether it is
reasonable to believe that the representation is included in the price and part of the agreement
between the parties.
127. See supra note 124 (reasoning that the optimal contract is one that maximizes the value
of both parties to the transaction).
128. See JACK HIRSCHAFER & AMIHAR GLAZER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 247-58
(5th ed. 1992); HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONoMIC ANALYsIs 52-71 (1978). Suppose for example
that a seller is selling a used car. The seller has just rebuilt the hydraulic system in the brakes.
Assume that he believes buyers would be willing to pay $300 more for a car with a warranty that
the brakes are nondefective. If the present cost to him of providing the warranty is $250 (the
expected cost of a breakdown and repair by the seller), the seller will be $50 better off offering
the car with the warranty.
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Even though a transaction is individually negotiated, a buyer might
be unaware of a contract term for a variety of reasons: inattention to
the contract terms either oral or written, oversight in reading a written
contract, or simple failure to read a written contract. If in an oral
contract a buyer fails to hear an affirmation or promise, it might be
possible to conclude that the buyer had no reason to believe that he
was paying for the representation in question. This conclusion is less
likely to be true with a writing, for a buyer probably assumes that he is
paying for all the terms in the writing, whether or not he has read it
and even if he has overlooked a term by mistake. Therefore, it is
more likely that he is bargaining for all the terms in the contract.
Moreover, as described in prior sections, under the objective theory of
contracts, a buyer's outward manifestation to a bargain is sufficient to
establish the existence of a bargain and satisfy the requirement of
consideration.129
Although determining the contents of a nonstandard form contract
might not be as onerous as for a standard form writing, reading and
evaluating a written contract still involves the opportunity cost of the
buyer's time. Requiring the buyer to know of an affirmation or prom-
ise prior to purchase would therefore increase transaction costs, per-
haps in some transactions by an amount exceeding the value of the
warranty, with little or no gain to the parties. Therefore, from an effi-
ciency perspective, ex ante knowledge of, bargaining for, or reliance
on, an affirmation or promise ought not be required to create an ex-
press warranty.
The only circumstance in which a court should require evidence of
negotiation or bargaining between the parties or proof of a represen-
tation by the seller 130 and reliance by the buyer is when the affirma-
tion or promise is idiosyncratic in the sense that it is valuable only to
and would therefore only be purchased by the particular buyer in-
volved. Although the buyer may still have a variety of motives in
purchasing the affirmation or promise, he must attach some value to it
or he otherwise would not purchase it. In the situation where the war-
ranty would be uniquely valuable to a particular buyer, the request for
129. See supra text accompanying notes 89-97 (analyzing the motives or causes for entering
into a bargain and the relevant consideration required). In a dissenting opinion in Harlingdon &
Leinster Enterprises Ltd. v. Christopher Hull Fine Art Ltd., 3 W.L.R. 13 (1990). The opinion by
Lord Justice Stuart-Smith correctly analyzed the question whether a buyer must prove reliance
on a description that is contained as one of the terms of a contract. He said: "If it is a term of the
contract.., the purchaser does not have to prove that he entered into the contract in reliance on
the statement." Id.
130. A buyer may provide for an express warranty in its manifestation of assent. Such an
inclusion is particularly likely when the warranty is idiosyncratic in nature.
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inclusion of the warranty in the deal will most likely come from the
buyer since he will more likely know the attributes he wants than the
seller. Therefore, it would be expected that the buyer would initiate
bargaining for the warranty, which would show that the affirmation or
promise was part of the basis of the bargain. Without proof of negoti-
ations or reliance, there may be substantial error costs in establishing
the existence of idiosyncratic representations.
D. Buyer Inspection or Use of Expert Opinion
Other situations in which there is a question whether a seller's state-
ment should be treated as an express warranty are those where a
buyer relies on her own inspection of a good to determine whether the
good possesses the attribute represented' 3' or there are obvious de-
fects that can be discovered in a cost-effective manner. Buyer inspec-
tion can be any conduct from simply looking at a product to make
sure that there are no obvious defects or imperfections, to a detailed
part-by-part analysis. Inspection can be done by either the buyer
alone or with the advice of an expert. The degree of buyer inspection
and the buyer's knowledge of a nonconformity should affect the en-
forcement of a representation as a warranty when buyer inspection is
the most cost-effective method of discovering defects before the com-
pletion of a sale.132
Where a good is purchased in a market in which a representation is
made to the entire market and a buyer pays the market price, the
buyer should be able to enforce an affirmation or promise as a war-
ranty because it is one of the attributes for which she has paid, as have
other buyers in the market.' 33 To negate the warranty solely because
of inspection would frustrate the value of both the warranty and the
benefits of inspection. If any inspection by a buyer precluded the es-
tablishment of a warranty, the incentive for buyers to perform simple,
cost-effective examinations would be reduced or eliminated since in-
spection would be costly for the buyer both in terms of the resources
devoted to the inspection and the lost value of the warranty. With a
131. See Sylvia Coal Co. v. Mercury Coal & Coke Co., 156 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1967) (finding
that a buyer who inspected coal before it was cleaned and delivered could not assert breach of
express warranty since buyer relied upon its own inspection rather than seller representations).
132. This conclusion follows from our analysis of "warranties and insurance problems" supra,
Part II.D, especially the analogy to the effect of an inspection of goods on the enforceability of
an implied warranty of merchantability under UCC section 2-216(3). But cf. General Elec. Co.
v. United States Dynamics, Inc., 403 F.2d 933 (1st Cir. 1968) (refusing to apply § 2-316(3) to an
express warranty).
133. See supra notes 41-44, 50-51 and accompanying text (finding that market price reflects all
attributes in the bundle and the bargain agreed to is for all attributes paid for).
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disincentive for a buyer to inspect, buyer inspections would not occur.
Without these buyer inspections, products with "obvious" nonconfor-
mities would be sold and then give rise to warranty claims, producing
an inefficient use of resources since the sales should not have occurred
or the warranty should have been negotiated in light of the nonconfor-
mities at the time of sale. Buyer inspection, in this sense, is a cost-
effective method of quality control and should be encouraged.
The general rule that inspection does not preclude the creation of a
warranty when the warranty is made to the market in general is sub-
ject to two exceptions. The first exception is designed to reduce the
inefficiencies that arise due to asymmetric information, moral hazard
and adverse selection. 134 It provides the circumstances under which
the buyer must disclose information to the seller or else with inspec-
tion the warranty will be unenforceable.
Whenever a buyer inspects a product before purchase and finds that
the product under consideration does not conform to the seller's affir-
mations or promises, the buyer should be precluded from enforcing
the claims as warranties unless the buyer makes the information
known to the seller and the seller remakes the representations to the
buyer. Such disclosure will prevent a misallocation of resources which
would result from the sale of a nonconforming product when a buyer
"snaps up a deal" in which a nonconformity can be discovered inex-
pensively. When the information is made available by the buyer, the
seller and buyer can negotiate for the optimal arrangement. For ex-
ample, they could provide for an acceptable substitute product, pro-
vide for the seller to cure the nonconforming product, adjust the price
to reflect the actual bundle being traded, or forego the transaction.
The second exception is related to the first. It bars an affirmation
or promise from being treated as a warranty where a buyer conducts
an inspection but fails to exercise reasonable care in doing so and
therefore does not discover a nonconformity. As discussed previ-
ously, buyers should have an obligation to conduct cost-effective pre-
purchase inspections to avoid the costs associated with purchasing
nonconforming products.135 Similarly, buyers should be precluded
from enforcing representations as warranties when they fail to exer-
cise reasonable care in conducting inspections because they could
134. See supra text accompanying notes 58-63.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65 (discussing when a buyer's inspection, or fail-
ure to inspect, bars or precludes the buyer from asserting express or implied warranties under
U.C.C. §§ 2-313 and 2-316(3) (1991)).
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avoid larger losses in dealing with nonconforming goods by taking
more care in inspection. 136
Buyer disclosure is required where the buyer is able to obtain the
information cost-effectively. Inspection by a buyer, including an in-
spection utilizing the services of an expert, that does not uncover non-
conformities precludes enforcement of a representation as a warranty
only to the extent that the nonconformities should have been discov-
ered with reasonable care.137 To the extent a normal, cost-effective
inspection does not disclose a nonconforming condition, the inspec-
tion does not alter the enforceability of the warranty offered by the
seller.138
For an individually negotiated transaction, the question of whether
inspection should prevent a representation from being treated as a
warranty is more difficult. The affirmation or promise in such a trans-
action may either be one that the seller would make to the market as a
whole or an idiosyncratic representation that would be valuable only
to the particular buyer.139 Nonetheless, the consequences of inspec-
tion should be the same. The issue is whether the buyer is purchasing
the seller's representation or buying the good without a warranty
based on his own assessment of the product. 40 In Sessa v. Riegle,'4'
the court indicated that a buyer of a race horse was not entitled to
treat a seller's representation that the horse was "sound" as part of
the basis of the bargain and therefore as an express warranty since the
buyer relied principally, if not exclusively, upon his own agent's as-
sessment of the horse to make the purchase decision.142 Contrary to
136. See supra text accompanying note 65.
137. Inspection, even by an expert, may reveal only that all attributes appear to be present
and that the product appears to conform to the seller's representations.
138. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b) (covering implied warranty for defects that an inspection would
not have revealed).
139. See supra part III (distinguishing affirmations or promises made to the market in general
and those that are idiosyncratic in nature).
140. See T.E. Lauer, Sales Warranties Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 Mo. L. REV.
259, 265-67 (1965) (stating that a buyer who conducts his own independent investigation of
goods and buys based on his own judgment cannot establish the reliance requirement, but if the
buyer then requests the seller's assurance as a precautionary matter, the representation would be
a warranty).
141. 427 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd 568 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1978). The principal holding
in the case is that the seller's representation was an opinion and therefore not an express war-
ranty. Id. at 765. The court further indicated that the representation might not be part of the
basis of the bargain. Id. Accord In re Jackson Television, Ltd., 121 B.R. 790 (Tenn. 1990) (noting
that a buyer may provide for an express warranty in its manifestation of assent).
142. But see O'Connor v. Judith B. & Roger C. Young, Inc., No. C-93-4547, 1995 WL 415138
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 1995) (holding seller's representation that a horse was a grand prix horse and
not an amateur horse is enforceable as a warranty even though buyer and agents conducted
extensive prepurchase inspections); Keith v. Buchanan, 220 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1985) (ruling repre-
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the court's indication, a buyer's reliance on her own expert's advice to
verify the seller's representation that an attribute exists implies that
the validity of the representation respecting the attribute was part of
the basis of the bargain. A court's decision to hold a representation
unenforceable can only be considered correct if there was a discount
of the price indicating that the buyer was not purchasing a commit-
ment from the seller.143 Allowing evidence of mere inspection to pre-
clude a warranty would discourage inspections and result in products
being sold with nonconformities that could have been discovered at
the time of sale. In Sessa, even if the buyer relied principally on his
own agent in determining to buy the horse, he should have been
treated as having purchased such a warranty if he paid the market
price for a sound horse.'"
If through an inspection a buyer discovers, or through the exercise
of reasonable care should discover, that the good does not conform to
an affirmation or promise, the buyer should be barred from enforcing
the representation as a warranty unless she discloses the nonconform-
ity to the seller and the latter reiterates the representation. Again, the
reasons are to avoid adverse selection and a misallocation of resources
and cause the person with superior information to disclose it. The
latter reason may be particularly appropriate for idiosyncratic affirma-
tions or promises since the buyer may have lower costs in determining
whether the product conforms to an affirmation.
E. Experimental Products
If a seller's affirmation pertains to an experimental product, a buyer
should not, subject to the limitation set forth below, be able to enforce
sentations in a brochure that boat was seaworthy enforceable even though buyer had some expe-
rience with sailboats and his friend in the boat-building business inspected the boat and said it
would suit his needs since the boat was inspected out of the water); City Mach. & Mfg. Co. v. A.
& A. Mach. Corp., 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 461 (N.Y. 1967) (finding a seller's represen-
tation, that a drill could obtain 1300 rpm enforceable even though plaintiff's employees in-
spected the machine and doubted the machine could obtain that speed, and a label on the side of
the machine indicated its top speed was 358 rpm; dictum that if buyer knew it were false, the
representation would not be a warranty).
143. See St. Charles Cable TV v. Eagle Comtronics, 687 F. Supp. 820, 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(finding that representations could not have been part of the basis of the bargain where the
buyer extracted substantial price concessions due to the experimental nature of the equipment
purchased).
144. 427 F. Supp. at 765. Even in markets where heterogeneous products are sold, statistical
tests can be performed to determine if a particular attribute is included in the market price. The
most common area where this type of analysis is used is in local housing markets, both with
appraisal data and econometric analysis. Thus, just because a transaction is individually negoti-
ated does not mean that a market price will not capture attribute values which are not explicitly
discussed and bargained for. See supra Part II.B (discussing the pricing of the complex product).
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the seller's representation about the product's attributes or perform-
ance as a warranty. 145 In many cases, for experimental products no
market price exists which incorporates the information of buyers and
sellers about the products' attributes. Thus, the presumption that the
market price captures the value of a seller's affirmations does not
apply.
When market prices for close substitutes to an experimental prod-
uct exist, even in markets where seller representations will ordinarily
be enforced, seller representations for experimental products should
not be presumptively enforced as warranties. The buyer should real-
ize from the uncertain or experimental nature of the undertaking that
the seller faces a substantial probability of being unable to produce
the product despite expending an appropriate level of resources and
does not have a comparative advantage vis-A-vis the buyer in provid-
ing the buyer with an appropriate remedy. 146 Moreover, if representa-
tions concerning such experimental products were enforceable as
warranties, sellers would expend additional resources to qualify repre-
sentations and/or would make fewer representations to assure they
are not treated as warranties, thereby decreasing the amount of valu-
able information available to buyers searching for such products.
Where buyers know or have reason to know the experimental nature
of the product, neither result is efficient. Under the circumstances,
therefore, the seller's representation should only be considered a com-
mitment to exert reasonable efforts to produce the good whose attrib-
utes are represented. If the seller exerts those efforts and fails, the
buyer has obtained what he bargained for. Only if the seller's repre-
145. See United States Fibres v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 509 F.2d 1043 (6th Cir. 1975) (find-
ing that a representation that machinery would produce products of a certain thickness not part
of the basis of the bargain when the parties knew that they were fabricating a piece of machinery
that was an unproven process); St. Charles Cable TV, 687 F. Supp. at 829 (noting in dictum that
representation that descramblers would have less than a 4% failure rate would not be part of the
basis of the bargain since plaintiff extracted substantial price concessions from defendant be-
cause of the experimental nature of the goods); see also Murray, supra note 6, at 302-07 (noting
that where representation pertains to an experimental good, the representation may be an objec-
tive to be obtained but not a commitment or warranty). But cf Babcock Poultry Farm, Inc. v.
Shook, 203 A.2d 399 (Pa. 1964) (finding sufficient evidence of warranty that experimental chick-
ens would lay more eggs than other variety).
146. The remedies provided by the Uniform Commercial Code for failure to deliver the good
would be the difference between the contract price and the market price or a price at which the
buyer could obtain a substitute good on the market together with any consequential foreseeable
losses sustained by the buyer. U.C.C. §§ 2-711 to 2-714 (1994). If the buyer accepts goods that
fail to conform to the contract, including any express warranty, the buyer may recover the differ-
ence between the value of the good delivered and the value that it would have had had it con-
formed to the contract together with foreseeable consequential losses. Id. Of course the parties
may provide for alternative remedies such as return of the purchase price, repair or replacement
of nonconforming goods or liquidated damages. Id. §§ 2-718(1), 2-719(1).
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sentation in the experimental or uncertain context makes clear that
the seller was committed either to producing the product with the rep-
resented attributes, or to affording the buyer a remedy for the seller's
failure to do so, should the representation be considered a war-
ranty. 147 Frequently, such representations may be made only on an
individually negotiated basis and not to the market as a whole. Unless
there is a manifest action providing the product with the attribute in
question or the buyer with a remedy, or unless there is an explicit
price adjustment to indicate that there is a warranty for the attribute
in question, the price of the product will not include the representa-
tion of the seller as a commitment on the latter's behalf.
F Long-standing Prior Representations
Another situation in which an affirmation, description or promise
may not be an express warranty exists when the representation is
made a substantial period of time prior to a buyer's purchase. 148 A
seller may, for example, conduct an advertising campaign claiming
that his product will have a specified attribute. Substantially after
conclusion of the campaign, a buyer purchases the product from the
seller. The question is whether the claim made substantially prior to
the purchase should be considered an express warranty. This issue is
comparable to that which exists when an offer expires and can no
longer be accepted by an offeree. 149 That question depends on the
terms of the offer. 150 If the offer specifies when it expires, the offeree
must accept prior to the end of that time.151 Similarly, if a seller speci-
fies the period of time for which his representation applies to his
goods or manifests that his representation applies only to a certain
year's model of goods, the market will consider the representation to
exist only for the goods specified. An individual buyer who purchases
after that period therefore should be treated as having purchased
147. Babcock Poultry Farm, 203 A.2d at 399; see Overstreet v. Norden Labs., 665 F.2d 1286
(6th Cir. 1982) (concluding that veterinarian could rely on seller representations about new
product to treat horses even though the veterinarian had some expertise); Butcher v. Garrett-
Enumclaw Co., 581 P.2d 1352 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that plaintiff who had considerable
knowledge and experience with sawmills entitled to rely on representations regarding new
unique mill which seller claimed could turn waste wood into valuable lumber and cut timber).
148. Vitro Corp. of Am. v. Texas Vitrified Supply Co., 376 P.2d 41 (N.M. 1962) (finding that
representations in sales literature from a prior purchase are part of the basis of the bargain for
instant transaction); cf. Murray, supra note 6, at 323 (noting that a representation made is en-
forceable as long as buyer can reasonably expect that it will be true at the time of purchase).
149. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 86, § 3.19 (discussing the lapse of an offer and the offeree's
power to accept the offer).
150. Id.
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 41(1) (1979).
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without a warranty and should at a minimum inquire whether the rep-
resentation is still effective. If an offer to enter into a contract says
nothing about when it expires, it lapses at the end of a reasonable
time, which is determined by the relevant circumstances surrounding
the making of the offer and the attempted acceptance. 152 For a repre-
sentation alleged to be a warranty which does not specify when it ex-
pires, the question is whether the market still treats the claim as one
of the product's attributes.
Enforcing a representation as a warranty after it is no longer part of
the bundle of attributes being sold will cause a misallocation of re-
sources. Buyers will purchase products that lack desired attributes
and then will assert warranty claims against sellers. In response, sell-
ers will increase prices to cover such claims, resulting in fewer prod-
ucts being purchased, and will include time limitations in some
representations when for the seller it would be uncertain ex ante what
the duration of the representations should be. The latter response
would limit the flexibility of sellers in making affirmations or promises
to the market.
One of the circumstances indicating whether a representation
should still be deemed an express warranty is whether the market
price for the good has shifted so that the representation is no longer
part of the bundle of attributes being sold by the seller. This determi-
nation will be complicated somewhat in transactions where the price is
individually negotiated. Even though the buyer may contend that he
can prove he paid a price higher than that paid by others in the mar-
ket, this proof may not be dispositive of the question whether he
purchased a warranty. All it may show is that the seller captured
some part of the consumer surplus153 the buyer would otherwise have
retained, or that there may be other, new attributes about which the
buyer is unaware. In this type of situation, the buyer should have to
prove that the bargain between the parties expressly included the
prior representation, for example, by showing that the two parties ne-
gotiated with respect to the representation and that it was included in
the bundle of attributes for the product sold by the seller.
Other factors relevant to the question whether a representation
should continue to be considered a warranty include the nature of the
product and the extent to which its attributes, other than an express
warranty, change over time. Also important is the relationship of the
152. Id. § 44.
153. Consumer surplus is simply the difference between the maximum price a buyer would be
willing to pay for a product and the actual (market) price he paid. VARIAN, supra note 128, at
207-15.
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parties. If the representation was made in a prior transaction but the
seller continues to provide a remedy if the goods fail to conform to the
warranty in subsequent transactions, a course of dealing may be estab-
lished between the parties which makes the warranty part of the sub-
sequent deals.'5 4 The determinative issue is whether the market
continues to treat the claim as one of the good's attributes. 155
154. See U.C.C. § 1-205(1) (1994) (defining course of dealing).
155. Two cases from the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts take conflicting positions
on whether a prior representation can be considered part of the basis of a present transaction.
In the first, Leavitt v. Fiberloid Co., 82 N.E. 682 (Mass. 1907), the plaintiff, who had purchased a
material used in making combs, encountered difficulties with a batch of the material. Thereafter,
one of defendant's agents guaranteed that in the future the material would be "all right." After
a number of intervening purchases, the plaintiff purchased a batch of the material that caught
fire. The plaintiff brought an action for breach of express warranty. The court held that the
agent's representation which was made sometime between January and March applied to a sale
of the material in October. The court reasoned:
Although no purchase was made at this time, it may fairly have been contemplated
by the parties that this was a continuing offer of guarantee, and that whatever goods
within a reasonable time were bought by the plaintiff of the defendant upon the
strength of the statement would be protected by it .... It is not necessary that the
giving of the warranty should be simultaneous with the sale. It is enough if it is made
under such circumstances as to warrant the inference that it enters into the contract as
finally made.
Id. at 684.
In the second case, Smith v. Denholm & McKay Co., 192 N.E. 631 (Mass. 1934), the plaintiff
purchased a cream represented to remove bodily hair. On the first occasion on which she
purchased the cream, a salesperson represented that the cream was safe and harmless. The
plaintiff made two subsequent purchases within seven months of the first purchase, but there
were no representations concerning the safety of the cream at the time of those purchases. The
plaintiff applied the cream to her body throughout the period. She was hospitalized with neuritis
derived from thallium poisoning, and the cream contained the poison thallium. The court re-
versed a trial court's ruling that the defendant had breached an express warranty to the plaintiff
on the ground that the affirmation by the first salesperson could not apply to the subsequent
sales for which no comparable representations were made. The court stated:
An affirmation of fact which is by statute made an express warranty cannot be held
to extend to cover subsequent sales which are supported by valid consideration in-
dependent of the consideration which supported the first sale, and were made by sales-
men who did not participate in the original sale and were without authority in fact to
make any affirmation of fact by way of warranty.
Id. at 633.
The court distinguished Leavitt v. Fiberloid Co., on the ground that the parties contemplated
continuing sales arising out of the original contract. The court's attempt to distinguish the Leav-
itt case is spurious. Under the standard used in that case, it appears reasonable for the plaintiff
to have believed that the representation that the hair-removing cream was safe would apply to
subsequent purchases until there was some change in the circumstances to indicate that the
product lacked that attribute. If the price of the product had dropped substantially, for example,
it may have been reasonable to conclude that the market had discovered that the product was
not safe or harmless. On the facts presented, however, there is no reason to believe that the
plaintiff or any other buyers were unjustified in believing that the cream retained the attribute of
safety.
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G. Post-contract Representations
In addition to representations made prior to or at the time of con-
tracting, a significant issue is whether a representation made after par-
ties enter into a contract should be enforceable as a warranty.
Currently, Comment Seven to UCC Section 2-313 indicates that the
time when an affirmation or promise is made is immaterial and that
the important fact is whether the representation may fairly be consid-
ered part of the contract.1 56 The comment then cites UCC Section 2-
209 which allows modification of a contract of sale without considera-
tion as a basis for treating a post-contract representation as a war-
ranty.' 57 In addition, at least one commentator favors treating post-
contract representations as part of the contract because of perceived
opportunity costs foregone by a buyer when the buyer receives the
representation. 158
From a market based perspective on how express warranties are
created, both of these positions are overly broad and allow for what
are in essence purely gratuitous promises to be enforced as warranties.
Gratuitous promises may be enforced, but not as warranties. Enforce-
ment should arise under supplemental principles of law, for example,
estoppel under UCC Section 1-103.159 There are limited circum-
stances under which post-contract representations should be enforcea-
ble as warranties.
H. Representations Not Available Until After Contract Formation
In some instances a seller or manufacturer may not make an affir-
mation or promise available until after the buyer has entered into a
contract of purchase. Frequently, these representations are found on
the container in which the good is packaged. The buyer does not
know of the affirmation, if at all, until the seller delivers the
product. 60
156. U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 7 (1994); see CLARK & SMrr, supra note 12, at 5 (finding post-sale
representation enforceable as a warranty on the basis that the concept of bargain constitutes an
ongoing business relationship or on the objective basis test that if the representation were made
prior to the sale it would have been one upon which a reasonable buyer would have relied).
157. U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 7 (1994).
158. Murray, supra note 6, at 313, 321.
159. See Bigelow v. Agway, Inc., 506 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding that a plaintiff may
recover for loss to his barn and hay after a fire occurred from storing wet hay in his barn pursu-
ant to post-sale representation by manufacturer's representative that hay could be bailed safely
if treated with Hay Savor).
160. From a market perspective, affirmations or promises that are not made available to a
buyer until after parties enter into a contract are comparable to representations that are avail-
able prior to contract formation but ordinarily are not seen or read by many or most buyers until
after the contract exists. As discussed earlier, the market provides for inclusion of such terms in
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From a market based perspective of express warranties, the affirma-
tion should not really be considered a post-contract representation.
Although technically inclusion of the warranty in the parties' agree-
ment might be considered a modification of an existing contract, the
representation will already have been included in the product's price.
Although the particular buyer and others may not have been aware of
the term prior to purchase, the market as a whole probably acquired
knowledge of the claim through repeat purchases by buyers who sub-
sequently become familiar with such terms. Their knowledge of the
term as part of the bundle of attributes being sold by the seller will be
sufficient to include the representation as part of the deal.' 6' Refusal
to enforce such representations would greatly increase transaction
costs in situations where it is much cheaper simply to provide a repre-
sentation on a package's container. 162
I. Options to Meet Changed Conditions
If the original bargain provides that such representations shall be
treated as part of the contract, the representation should be treated as
part of the deal. In this case, the buyer or the market had to pay for
inclusion of this representation in the original contract. Along similar
lines, a seller who has a policy of matching competitors' terms or of
giving customers who bought products within a certain prior period
new commitments offered to the market, should have its new commit-
ment enforced. The seller has in essence sold the buyer a valuable
the price of a product. See supra text accompanying notes 98-107 (discussing inclusion of accu-
rate representations in product brochures and manuals and in product price). The only differ-
ence between those affirmations and promises and the ones discussed in this Section is the
manner in which the law considers them to have become part of a contract. The representations
that are made prior to conclusion of the contract may be considered part of the original bar-
gained for exchange, whereas the representations that are made after the contract is formed may
be perceived as contract modifications governed by UCC section 2-209.
161. The price of the representation probably is included in the product's market price even
prior to the time that marginal buyers know the claim exists. A seller who wants to make a
credible affirmation or promise that buyers can enforce will want the representation to be en-
forceable by even the first set of buyers. The seller must include an amount in the price to cover
the expected costs of warranty claims from such buyers. Therefore, the price of the representa-
tion is likely to be included in the price for these buyers. Denying enforcement to these buyers
also would increase transaction costs by forcing sellers to negotiate individually with or apprise
the buyers of the affirmation or promise. Only if the evidence establishes that the parties negoti-
ated to sell the product at a price not including the affirmation or promise should the representa-
tion be treated not as a warranty.
162. For authority enforcing a representation on a container made available to the buyer after
contract formation, see Marston v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours, 448 F. Supp. 172, 173 (W.D. Va.),
vacated and remanded 580 F.2d 1048 (4th Cir. 1978). But see Schmaltz v. Nissen, 431 N.W.2d
657, 661 (S.D. 1988) (stating that affirmations on seed bags are not part of the basis of the
bargain since they are not seen by buyer prior to conclusion of sale).
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option at the time of entering into the original contract. The price of
this option will be included in the purchase price; hence, the option
will be part of the basis of the bargain.
J. Right to Revoke or Reject
When a seller extends a warranty to a buyer who has a right to
reject the goods for a nonconformity or to revoke acceptance because
of a nonconformity which substantially impairs the value of the goods
to him, the representation should be enforceable when it is part of an
agreement to induce the buyer to retain and pay for the goods. In this
situation, the representation is a new attribute which, together with
the nonconforming good, creates a bargain equal to the market value
of the original transaction.
K. Goodwill and Reputation
A representation should be enforceable when it is part of an im-
plicit exchange in which the seller seeks continued buyers' goodwill
through continued purchases. 163 From a market perspective, the seller
may desire to make an enforceable commitment to previous buyers to
assure they will return and not deal with competitors. 164 If the post-
sale representation were not independently enforceable, the buyer
and seller would have to go through the deadweight cost of initiating a
transaction with another seller and then the initial seller providing the
warranty in order to retain the buyer's patronage. These costs can be
avoided if the transaction is recognized as one in which the seller is
attempting to keep the buyer's continued goodwill and the affirmation
or promise is enforced. Of course, if the seller or the context clearly
indicates that the seller's post-contract representation applies only to
163. Abex Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 741 F.2d 1235 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that post-
contract representations to employees of the plaintiff were enforceable since they were made to
promote future sales with Abex). But see Hrosik v. J. Keim Builders, 345 N.E.2d 514 (Ill. Ct.
App. 1976) (holding that post-contract representation by sellers of model house that the equip-
ment would be warranted were not part of the basis of the bargain since no reliance and no new
consideration); Stang v. Hertz Corp., 490 P.2d 475 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that a repre-
sentation by a salesperson to the plaintiff who was renting a car after the rental agreement was
entered into that the tires were good was not enforceable since it was made after the contract
was entered into).
164. Professors White and Summers would enforce post-contract representations in only lim-
ited situations, one of which exists when a purchaser has just purchased a good, has not yet
removed it from the store, and could, as a matter of business practice, return the good at the
time the seller made the post-sale statement. WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 11, § 9-5.
Although the authors appear to justify enforcement of the representation on business practice,
we would do so under our model when it is reasonable to believe that the representation is made
to retain the buyer's goodwill, which would probably be true in most of these situations.
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new purchasers or to newer models of the good, then the representa-
tion should not be enforceable by the original buyers as part of an
implicit exchange to retain their goodwill.
L. Post-contract Limitation
A post-contract affirmation or promise need not be specifically bar-
gained for 165 or require new consideration given for it to be consid-
ered a modification of a previous contract under UCC Section 2-
209.166 The representation would not be part of the basis of the bar-
gain, however, unless at a minimum the affirmation or promise was
implicitly given to retain the goodwill of the buyer. 167 This limitation
on what post-contract representations should be treated as warranties
could be perceived as a limitation on the rule in UCC Section 2-209(1)
that a contract for the sale of goods can be modified without consider-
165. But see Kwestel, supra note 71, at 1025-26. The author maintains that although there
need be no consideration for a post-contract warranty, there must be a bargain between the
parties and not simply a unilateral representation by the seller. See U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (stating
that an agreement modifying a contract needs no consideration to be binding); see also WfrrrE &
SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 340 (noting that upon analyzing case law on both sides of the reli-
ance issue, courts seem to retain the requirement by viewing affirmations using the "basis of the
bargain" test). Although this approach appears to be consistent with the literal language of
UCC section 2-209(1), which requires a mutual agreement for the modification of a contract, it
imposes deadweight negotiating costs on the parties which are unnecessary since the seller can
craft the language of his post-contract warranty in a manner that will avoid his inappropriately
being subject to liability to buyers to whom he does not intend the warranty to extend.
166. U.C.C. § 2-209(1).
167. For a case that is compatible with the contract modification rule in UCC Section 2-
209(1), that a modification of a contract needs no additional consideration to be binding, but that
is inconsistent with our model requiring that there be an implicit exchange between the buyer
and the seller to retain the latter's goodwill, see Autzen v. John C. Taylor Lumber Sales, Inc., 572
P.2d 1322 (Ore. 1977). There the plaintiff entered into a contract to purchase a 50-foot boat
from the defendant. After the parties had negotiated the terms of the deal, the seller offered to
have the boat inspected. The buyer said that an inspection was unnecessary, but the inspection
was conducted nevertheless. The person conducting the inspection reported that the vessel was
clean, dry and well-ventilated. The inspection report was given to the buyer prior to taking
possession of the vessel. Several months after taking delivery, the buyer discovered that the boat
had substantial dry rot and sought to revoke his acceptance. The court held that the inspection
report was part of the basis of the bargain since the concept of "bargain" is more extensive under
the UCC than under the common law and the bargain was not completed at the time the repre-
sentation was made since the buyer had not taken possession of the boat. Id. at 1325-26. More-
over, the court concluded: "While this description did not induce the actual formation of the
contract, the jury might have found that it did induce and was intended by the Seller to induce
Buyer's satisfaction with the agreement just made, as well as to lessen Buyer's degree of vigi-
lance in inspecting the boat prior to acceptance." Id. at 1326. This latter rationale and the
court's treatment of the representation is inappropriate under the test we propose for there is no
reason to believe that the seller made the representation to retain the buyer's goodwill since the
seller was in the lumber not the boat selling business. Realistically, the post-sale representation
was merely a gratuitous statement.
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ation, but it more appropriately accords with how businesses and mar-
kets operate in providing these kinds of contract terms.168
V. FALSE REPRESENTATIONS MADE BEFORE SALE
As discussed previously, the market incentives for sellers to offer
true representations as part of a product's bundle of attributes are
strong.169 Nonetheless, false representations are sometimes made.
The laws of fraud and misrepresentation 170 and federal and state de-
ceptive trade practices statutes171 regulate many of such claims. This
Article's test for whether an affirmation or promise is an express war-
ranty does not negate the application of those statutes or laws. In-
deed, in this section the Article considers only those situations in
which the seller makes a representation which at the time it is made
the seller believes to be true, but which later is discovered to be false.
False representation issues arise when a representation becomes false,
is found to be false for a category of buyers, or is known by a buyer to
be false at the time of purchase. This Article considers each of these
possibilities below.
The same basic analysis as applied to true representations holds for
false ones. If the price of the product bundle includes a payment for a
claim and if the buyer does not know and could not through the exer-
cise of reasonable care have known that the claim is false, the repre-
sentation should be enforced as a warranty. If the buyer knows, or
through the exercise of reasonable care should know, that the claim is
false, then the representation should not be enforced. This exception
to the general rule will provide the correct incentives for buyers to
undertake cost-effective inspection and provide valuable information
to the market. Thus, the inefficiencies of adverse selection, moral haz-
ard, and "snapping up a deal," i.e., purchasing a good knowing a rep-
resentation is false with the expectation of receiving a remedy, will be
minimized. Once the market has adjusted the price of a product to
reflect the absence of the claim, buyers can no longer enforce the rep-
168. Kwestel maintains that there may be no post-contract warranty modifying a sales con-
tract if the contract has been fully performed on both sides. Kwestel, supra note 71, at 1028. For
example, if the seller has delivered the good and has no continuing obligation with respect to it
and the buyer has paid for the good, there is no contract remaining to modify under UCC sec-
tion 2-209(1). Id. Under our model the seller could still make an enforceable warranty since his
affirmation or promise with respect to the good would be given as part of an implicit exchange
for the buyer's goodwill. It is this implicit exchange that our model would treat as the new
contract between the parties.
169. See supra text accompanying section IV.B.
170. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS §§ 525, 526, 530, 532, 535, 538 (1977).
171. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 19.86.020 (West 1989).
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resentation even if they erroneously believe that the representation or
claim is still being made.
Whether affirmations or promises that a buyer knows or has reason
to know are false should be enforced is disputed by courts and com-
mentators.172 Some of the dispute is due to the lack of a clear defini-
tion of the term "false."'1 73 Some of the disagreement arises as the
result of conflicting desired outcomes-the insurance role of warranty
law, efficiency concerns, and equity issues. 174 Therefore, we first de-
scribe in some detail what we mean by a "false" claim and what effi-
ciency issues need to be considered. Second, we indicate how our
market based test would operate depending on the nature of the affir-
mation and the character of the falsity.
An affirmation or promise made by a seller can be false in a number
of senses. 175 In the "classical" sense, a false representation is one that
is universally untrue. For example, a seller claims that a copier will
produce 1,000 color copies per minute when, in fact, it is only capable
of producing 100 copies per minute whatever the circumstances.
Other than purposeful or negligent falsehoods, representations which
are believed to be true at the time when made by the seller might
become classically false as the result of either changed technology or
information 176 or due to the novelty and lack of market experience
with a new product.
172. For authorities that a buyer knowing or having reason to know that a representation is
false cannot enforce it as a warranty, see Galli v. Metz, 973 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1992); Royal
Business Machs., Inc. v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34 (7th Cir. 1986); United States Fibres, Inc. v.
Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 509 F.2d 1043 (6th Cir. 1975); Coffee v. Ulysses Irrigation Pipe Co., 501
F. Supp. 239 (Tex. 1983); Wendt v. Beardmore Suburban Chevrolet, Inc., 66 N.W.2d 424, 429
(Neb. 1985); Allied Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Pico, 656 P.2d 849 (Nev. 1983); Murray, supra note 6, at
294. For contrary authority, see Kwestel, supra note 71, at 1014.
173. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 159 (1981) ("Whether a statement is
false depends on the meaning of the words in all the circumstances, including what may fairly be
inferred from them.").
174. Because a warranty provides a form of insurance to the buyer, problems related to moral
hazard and adverse selection can arise impairing market efficiency see supra Section II.D. To
foster efficiency, then, implies providing less insurance through warranties. However, less exten-
sive or available warranties will increase search costs creating other efficiency problems. See,
Section II.F, supra. Moreover, without some form of insurance through warranties product fail-
ures would leave the loss on the buyer, a possible unfair or inequitable outome.
175. Our taxonomy of falsity is provided for expository convenience and analytical clarity.
Other definitions of false statements or claims made to the market are certainly possible. The
three cases we consider below, though, present what we believe are the most important situa-
tions of erroneous or false terms coming to the market through warranty representations.
176. An example of changed information resulting in a claim originally perceived to be true
but subsequently found to be false may be found in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d
541, 572 (3rd Cir. 1990).
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A representation is false in a "probabilistic" sense when a seller
makes a claim which is generally but not always true. A probabilisti-
cally false claim while true for most circumstances will not be true
some of the time, but the time or circumstance at which the claim will
be false cannot be easily (cost-effectively) determined. For some
probabilistically false claims, sellers will offer a remedy, such as repair
or replacement of a part(s) claimed to have an attribute which may
not exist, as part of a warranty package. As long as the revenue re-
ceived from buyers is greater than (or equal to) the cost to the seller
of providing the remedy, the seller will offer probabilistically false
claims to the market.177 It will be more efficient to offer these "false"
terms than to expend (even greater) resources in an attempt to reduce
or eliminate the "falsity." For example, an automobile seller may
claim that a car has no defects, even though the seller knows that
there may be some type of problem. The claim is false in the sense
that for some cases a problem exists. However, the nature of the
problem that will manifest itself is unknown (at least without expen-
sive inspection and testing by the seller) at the time of sale. The cost
for the seller to eliminate the defect (before the sale) will be greater
than the cost of honoring the warranty.
A representation is "situationally" false when it is always or almost
always untrue for one or some types of buyers or circumstances but
true for all or most others. 178 An example of situational falsity for a
buyer or group of buyers is a claim by a detergent seller that its soap is
"kind to hands" when the detergent causes a rash for a buyer or small
group of buyers who suffer an allergic reaction to the product. The
claim is false for the person(s) suffering the allergic reaction although
it is true for everyone else. Because it may be too costly for a seller to
identify the groups and users for whom the claim would be false, the
seller will offer the general affirmation to the market. Although a
buyer for whom the claim is false may not be able to enforce the war-
ranty because the representation is interpreted as not applying to the
buyer's particular situation,179 the seller may provide some accommo-
177. Analytically with probabilistic falsity, a representation that a product is free from defects,
for example, is false for at least some cases. However, the warranty can be true in the sense that
it is a promise to provide a remedy for the discovered defect. Thus, the warranty is not false, but
the "defect-free" representation is.
178. Spiegel v. Saks, 272 N.Y.S. 2d 976 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966) (ruling that a buyer is entitled
to recover for breach of warranty that product was safe for removing age spots even though
buyer's adverse reaction was idiosyncratic).
179. See Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 253 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952); Zager v.
F. W. Woolworth Co., 86 P.2d 389 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939). But see Drake v. Charles Fifth Avenue,
307 N.Y.S. 2d 310 (N.Y. App Div. 1970) (allergic reaction no defense to warranty claim for
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dation, e.g. a refund of the price, to the buyer for whom the claim is
false in order to maintain goodwill, particularly with repeat buyers.
A. Probabilistically False Terms Offered to the Market
Claims which are made to the market and which are probabilisti-
cally false should be enforced except when a buyer knows or through
the exercise of reasonable care should know of the falsity. The pur-
pose of the warranty is to minimize the cost of search and inspec-
tion 180 by providing information to the buyer. The warranty also
provides the buyer with insurance against the consequences arising
from the failure of the product to have the attribute warranted. The
only way to determine product nonconformity is through product use
by the buyer. In this sense, the buyer is the least-cost discoverer of
the defect and is in the best position to learn of the nonconformity. 181
Since the buyer paid for the insurance, since the insured against event
occurred, and since the buyer took all cost-effective precautions to
prevent the failure, the warranty should be enforced as promised.
An exception to the general rule of enforcing warranty claims that
are probabilistically false exists when the claim will also be situation-
ally false to a particular buyer and the buyer knows, or through the
exercise of reasonable care should know, the claim is false. Thus,
when a buyer knows, or should have known, that a warranty claim will
be false in the buyer's circumstance, the buyer should make this infor-
mation known to the seller. Not enforcing the term where the buyer
is in the better position to avoid the losses resulting from the false
claim will promote efficiency by reducing moral hazard and adverse
selection problems.
injury caused by product represented to be safe); accord irino v. Kenner Products Co., 341
N.Y.S.2d 61 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973).
A comparable issue arises in strict products liability in torts. A product may be harmless to
most consumers expected to use or be affected by it. Nevertheless, there may be some small
segment of the population that has a "hypersensitive" reaction to the product and is injured by
it. Under products liability law, a seller who distributes such a product is not liable to persons
having such an idiosyncratic response so long as the seller informs buyers of the risk of the
reaction. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. I (1965); Annotation, Seller's or Man-
ufacturer's Liability for Injuries as Affected by Buyer's or User's Allergy or Unusual Susceptibility
to Injury from Article, 26 A.L.R.2d 963 (1952).
180. See supra section II.F (discussing warranties and search costs).
181. In theory, sellers could always test for failure and defect. However, such testing might
not be cost-effective. Some detection might require destructive testing or extensive testing
which would reduce the value of the product to consumers, e.g., driving tires 30,000 miles to
make sure they will not fail. Or the cost to sellers of testing and quality control might be greater
than the expected loss from having to honor the claims of buyers under the terms of the
warranty.
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Individualized knowledge of the situational falsity of a representa-
tion which is made to all buyers in a market is important in two addi-
tional respects. First, although UCC section 2-601 adopts the perfect
tender rule under which a buyer can reject a good for any noncon-
formity, section 2-608 permits a buyer to revoke his acceptance of a
good only if the nonconformity substantially impairs its value to him.
A buyer who entered into a contract to purchase a good, knowing that
an affirmation or promise was false, might assert the ability to reject
the good upon the seller's tender.'l 2 Permitting such a rejection
would be inappropriate for it would allow the buyer to enter a binding
contract which he considers optimal even with the false affirmation or
promise and then be able to renege on the transaction if for some
reason unrelated to the falsity of the seller's claim the deal becomes
disadvantageous. Not only would this result cause sellers to undergo
unnecessary transaction costs in tendering nonconforming goods, but
it would also force them to over-invest resources to assure that their
representations are correct to protect themselves, through self insur-
ance, hedging or otherwise, against such buyer behavior. When the
buyer has accepted the good which he purchased with knowledge that
an affirmation or promise was false, he should be precluded from be-
ing able to revoke his acceptance on the ground that the nonconform-
ity does not substantially impair the value of the transaction to him. 183
A contrary result would cause sellers to engage in the protective be-
havior mentioned with respect to rejection and to over-invest re-
sources in assuring that their representations are accurate. The buyer
should be bound to pay the price for the good,' s4 and be able to re-
cover the difference between the good as warranted and the value of
the good as received.'8 5 If a buyer knows that a claim is false, either
at the time of purchase or shortly thereafter, and continues to use the
product, the principle of mitigation of damages in the common law
and in section 2-715(2)(a) of the UCC indicates, together with the
least-cost avoider principle of economics, that the seller should not be
182. But cf U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b) (1983) (permitting no recovery under an implied warranty
theory for defects that examination ought to have revealed); Land v. Roper Corp., 531 F.2d 445,
448 (10th Cir. 1976) (no breach of warranty by seller where buyer made independent investiga-
tion and did not rely on seller's warranty).
183. See Kwestel, supra note 71, at 1014 (noting that under the common law of contracts a
buyer who has antecedent knowledge that a promise or affirmation is false should not be able to
avoid the transaction based on a material breach).
184. U.C.C. § 2-607(1) (1983) ("The buyer must pay at the contract rate for any goods
accepted.").
185. U.C.C. § 2-714(2) (1983) (providing that "[t]he measure of damages for breach of war-
ranty is the difference ... between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would
have had if they had been as warranted").
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liable for consequential damages. 186 If the seller is liable for such
damages, there are substantial risks of adverse selection and moral
hazard. People will purchase and use products they know present a
substantial risk of injuring them because they are insured against such
losses by the seller.
B. Situationally False Market Representations Known False to an
Individual
An affirmation or promise may be offered in the market which is
true for most buyers, but which is false in a particular circumstance.
As hypothesized previously, a detergent seller may affirm to the mar-
ket that its soap is "kind to hands." A buyer may purchase the deter-
gent on a periodic basis and discover that the soap causes a rash on
her hands. If the affirmation is interpreted to apply to the injury to
the buyer's hands, she should not be able to enforce the claim if the
buyer continued to purchase and use the product after she learned, or
through the exercise of reasonable care should have learned, that the
claim of kindness was false for her although it is true for others.
Not enforcing a claim after a buyer knows it is situationally false
avoids a misallocation of resources, adverse selection, and moral haz-
ard. It also provides an incentive for the buyer to convey information
to the seller and to the market about the falsity of the representa-
tion.187 To be able to enforce the representation, the buyer should be
required to disclose its discovery of the falsity of the representation to
the seller, and the seller must remake the affirmation or promise. In
the alternative, if the seller anticipates that a buyer will perceive a
representation as "too good to be true" and assures the buyer ex ante
that what appears to be false is true, the seller's affirmation or prom-
ise should be enforceable despite the buyer's perception of its fal-
sity.188 Unless a seller is able to make an enforceable representation
under such a circumstance, it will be difficult for the seller to create a
186. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 568 n.31 (3rd Cir. 1990) (indicating
that buyer who believed representation was false could not recover consequential damages
where such damages could have been avoided "without undue risk, expense, or humiliation").
187. But see Kwestel, supra note 71, at 1014 (arguing that a purchaser who knows that a
representation is false prior to entering into a transaction should be able to enforce it despite
that knowledge).
188. It is difficult to assert merely from the price at which the product is sold that the seller is
continuing to adhere to the validity of its representation. Although the price may remain the
same despite the discovery of the representation's falsity, it may be that the price has shifted for
the value of the entire bundle of true attributes encapsulated in the good or that the seller is
obtaining more of the buyer's consumer surplus.
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market for a product where consumer skepticism of the product's at-
tributes or performance is high.
C. Classically False Representations
Classically false claims arise when sellers offer representations
about a product's attribute bundle which both they and buyers believe
are true and the market price reflects the presence of the representa-
tion in the product bundle, but the attribute is not part of the bun-
dle. 189 This situation reflects an honest failure to know that the
attribute does not exist. The law treats this situation as one of honest
misrepresentation on the part of sellers.190 Since it is inefficient for
buyers to inspect in detail every claim made by sellers, most buyers
rely on the market to generate appropriate information about and
pricing of product bundles. Similarly, it is cost-effective for sellers,
after reasonable testing and quality control, to bring product bundles
to the market without extensive, destructive, or absolutely complete
testing.' 91 Since it is not efficient for either buyers or sellers to deter-
mine with absolute certainty the truthfulness of all claims and repre-
sentations, it is possible for some product attributes, in this case
affirmations or promises, to be offered and priced in the market incor-
rectly. A classically false claim is distinguishable from probabilisti-
cally and situationally false claims in the sense that the claim is not
189. As the Article discusses below, in Part V.C.1, classically false representations cause the
market to move through three "phases." Only during the initial phase is it necessarily true that
all buyers and sellers believe the representation to be true. Because all market participants be-
have as if the representation were true, the market price will include payment for the value of
the representation. Once some participants discover that the representation is not true, the mar-
ket will move to a second phase where adjustments to the market terms will occur. See infra
notes 201-08 and accompanying text.
190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 ill. 2 (1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 552C (1977); see generally Alfred Hill, Damages for Innocent Misrepresentation, 73
COLUM. L. REV. 679 (1973).
191. Suppose it would take an additional $200 for a seller to conclusively inspect or test a
product to insure that a representation is true. If the seller believes, after a given amount of
testing, that the probability of a claim being brought due to the representation's failure is one in
a hundred (one percent of the time) and that the value of satisfying the claim (when it does in
fact arise) is $500, then the expected value of the claim is only $5. In this situation it would be
inefficient to require the seller to make the $200 expenditure to save only $5. Inspection in this
case would be inefficient. This argument follows the traditional Learned Hand negligence stan-
dard in tort law: to avoid liability it is necessary to expend resources on care only up to the point
where the cost of care would equal (or be less than) the benefit of exercising care (the
probability of a loss times the value of the loss). See United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d
169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) ("If the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability
depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL."). The difference
here is that the seller is generating information about the representation's truthfulness through
testing, not investing in safeguards or behavioral changes to avoid an accident. However, the
economic analysis is exactly the same from an efficiency perspective.
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false just for some buyers or under some circumstances but is false for
everyone all of the time.
One way to conceptualize a classically false representation is as a
mistake or accident. 192 As is the case with any accident, loss and "in-
jury" occur. The loss consists of the value of the attribute for which
the buyers paid but which they did not get, together with any other
consequential loss such as personal injury.193 To push the analogy
with accidents a bit further, the seller may not have been negligent,
nor was there contributory negligence on the part of the buyer. This,
indeed, is the case of "pure" accident. 194 An efficient rule for enforc-
ing warranty claims in the case of classical falsity should provide in-
centives to reduce the number of classically false claims to the optimal
level, minimize the costs from adverse selection and moral hazard,
promote the flow of true information to the point where it has the
highest value in terms of eliminating the classically false representa-
tion, and prevent excessive proof and transaction costs. When a situa-
tion of classical falsity arises, the market will move through three
distinct phases. During the first, original phase, buyers and sellers will
believe the representation is true, and the market will price the prod-
uct accordingly. Thus, buyers will pay for an attribute which they do
not receive, and sellers will be compensated for providing an attribute
which is missing from the product bundle. In the final, completion
phase, the market will have adjusted to the true information that the
attribute is not in the bundle, buyers will not pay for the attribute, and
sellers will not offer the affirmation or promise in the market. The
intermediate or detection phase is that period of time during which
the information that the attribute is missing becomes known to at least
some buyers and some sellers but before the price completely adjusts
to the new information. In the detection phase, then, some buyers will
be paying for an attribute that is missing, some sellers will not realize
that the product being sold lacks the attribute, and the market price
(at least in part) includes a payment for the false claim. The longer
the time for the initial and detection phases, the higher the costs from
192. Under the law of misrepresentation an innocent, nonnegligent misrepresentation may be
based on mistake. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 159 cmt. a, illus. 1,164 cmt. b,
illus. 2.
193. U.C.C. §§ 2-714 & 2-715. Section 2-714 provides for the difference between the actual
value of the goods as delivered versus what the value would have been had the goods been
delivered as warranted. Section 2-715(2)(b) specifically provides recovery for personal injury.
194. Classically false representations can also arise due to negligence on the part of the seller
as when the seller fails to perform tests or research which should have cost-effectively been
done.
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resource misallocation. 195 In the initial phase, both buyers and sellers
are making mistakes. Buyers will suffer from "product disappoint-
ment" and possible consequential losses. Sellers will incur high claim
costs or lost goodwill from disappointed customers. Costs will be re-
duced to some extent during the detection phase as some buyers and
sellers realize the truth about the falsity of the representation and the
price partially adjusts to exclude an amount for the false representa-
tion. Losses will still occur and inefficient trades will take place. For
efficiency reasons, therefore, legal rules are needed to reduce the
amount of time it takes to move from the initial phase to the final,
completion phase. Once the market reaches the completion phase,
buyers get what they pay for, sellers no longer make untrue represen-
tations, and the market price accurately reflects the value of all the
attributes in the product bundle. Because of the different information
available, behavioral incentives, and market pricing in each of the
three phases, we consider the application of our market based rule for
warranty enforcement in each phase separately.
1. Initial Phase
In the initial phase buyers pay for something which they do not get;
sellers believe they are selling an attribute and receiving appropriate
compensation through the market price. Not even marginal buyers,
during this phase, have enough information to deduce that the repre-
sentation is false. Sellers expect to incur costs for warranty claims
only to the extent that the claims are probabilistically false and believe
that the payment for providing the term will cover their expected costs
from claims.
Warranty claims during the initial phase should be enforceable, sub-
ject to the exceptions for singular falsity and representations that buy-
ers should discover to be false through the exercise of reasonable care.
Enforcing claims, when false, will increase seller costs and provide a
clear signal to sellers that what they thought to be true is in fact not
true and result in sellers either modifying their products or removing
their claims from the market. Since detailed inspection and testing by
either the buyer or seller would not generate better information in a
cost-effective manner (if it had, it would have been done already), the
195. These costs include, obviously, the transaction costs of buyers bringing warranty claims to
sellers for a remedy. In addition, for buyers whose losses are not large enough to merit making a
claim, they suffer losses from not having the missing attribute, including the cost, perhaps, of
obtaining a replacement. Sellers who respond to claims incur costs for providing the remedies
and dealing with disappointed customers. Finally, society suffers the deadweight loss of allocat-
ing resources to the production of a product beyond the optimal level.
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least-cost way to inform the seller that the attribute is absent from the
product bundle is by allowing buyers' claims to be enforced. Buyer
experience with the product will provide information about the miss-
ing attribute. By allowing buyer claims to be enforced, sellers will ex-
perience claim costs in excess of what sellers received in payment for
the missing attribute from buyers. The excessive claim costs will pro-
vide sellers with the incentive to inquire into the causes for the exces-
sive claims through market research, to devote more resources to
inspection,. which now become cost-effective, 196 and, if adjustments to
eliminate the problem cannot be made in a cost-effective manner, to
alter the attribute bundle or market price.
Refusal of buyer warranty claims when representations are false
would reduce the value of information signals (from the availability of
a warranty) in the market and lead to a misallocation of resources.
Buyers would discount substantially (possibly to zero) the value of
representations which they did not know were true. For buyers to
value representations ex ante, they would have to inspect excessively
to determine the truthfulness of representations. 97 Ascertaining the
truthfulness of representations would confirm the value of sellers' sig-
nals when they are true. But their value as signals when true would be
the only value of the representations. The value in providing buyers
with an enforceable claim about the existence of product attributes
would be destroyed since buyers could not bring a claim if a represen-
tation were false. Since providing such a claim is the central function
of a warranty in most instances, buyers would pay much less, in proba-
bly many situations nothing, for seller representations. With a decline
in the amount that sellers received for offering representations, sellers
would reduce the number of representations to the market. 98 Given
196. During the initial phase the sellers' information was incorrect, but this was unknown.
That is, sellers believed that the representation was true and that claim costs (arising for
probabilistically false reasons) would be less than or equal to the revenue received by including
the attribute in the product bundle. The correct information is that the representation is false.
Sellers now find the claim costs rising above their prior estimates. Originally sellers did not
spend $200 to investigate an attribute's truthfulness to save an expected $5 in claim costs. How-
ever, now the number of claims exceeds what was expected. Rather than a $500 claim occurring
one in one hundred occasions, claims might be running at 50%, one half of the buyers returning
with a claim. Given this new data about the occurrence of claims, the sellers will revise their
expected claims costs to be $250. Now it will be efficient and profitable for sellers to spend $200
on additional inspections.
197. Assuming that buyers at this stage believe the claim to be true and are paying for the
representation, they should only undertake cost-effective inspections.
198. Jean Braucher, An Informal Resolution Model of Consumer Product Warranty Law, 1985
Wis. L. REV. 1405 ("[T]he purpose of consumer product warranties is to create legal rights,
enforceable by means of litigation.").
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sellers' and buyers' preferences for express warranties, they will be
underproduced.
Arguably, allowing buyer claims to be enforced would seem to in-
crease the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, leading to
additional resource misallocation. Such problems will not, however,
increase. Since both buyers and sellers during the initial phase believe
the representations to be true, no one has any additional incentive to
purchase or use the product more intensively other than in the way
that would occur if, indeed, the representation were true. In all cases
with insurance, moral hazard and adverse selection problems exist.
But, enforcing claims for what are believed to be truthful representa-
tions will not exacerbate the problems.
A second argument against enforcing the claims during the initial
phase is that if claims were denied, buyers would have an incentive to
bargain for a lower price which would accurately reflect the actual
attributes in the bundle. For this argument to have compelling force,
one must assume that buyers can influence pricing adjustments more
rapidly than can sellers199 and that buyers will obtain information
about the falsity of representations more quickly than will sellers. The
former is not likely to be true, since most often sellers control the
offering price decision, market the product, and determine what at-
tributes are included. Moreover, there is no reason to believe a priori
that sellers will decide the best solution is to reduce the price (or that
buyers will value this option the most). It could be more efficient to
redesign the product, provide alternative attributes to replace the
missing one, or otherwise modify the product to meet the desires of
buyers. The incentive to explore these alternative solutions would be
reduced if buyer claims were not enforced. If warranty claims are not
honored and buyers learn claims are denied, they will have little in-
centive to bring the problem of the missing attribute to the attention
of sellers and reduced incentives to inform other buyers. Thus, it will
take longer for the information about the falsity of the representation
to reach the sellers. Until the sellers realize the problem, adjust the
199. In most product markets buyers cannot influence prices more quickly than can sellers.
Sellers actually "set" prices in the sense of placing an offering price on the product. Buyers
influence the price by choosing to purchase or not at the seller's stated price. The seller learns if
the posted price is correct through observing buyer behavior, lowering the price when inven-
tories accumulate beyond desired levels, and raising the price when inventories are depleted
more rapidly than desired. In this sense, sellers actually "watch" buyers and the sellers collect
the information to alter prices. The main exception to this form of market pricing is the auction
where buyers actually call out the prices to consummate a transaction. In this price setting envi-
ronment, buyers "watch" sellers and adjust the price accordingly. However, we view these "auc-
tion-type" markets as the exception, not the rule.
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price, or alter the bundle, mistaken sales will continue. As a result,
the losses to buyers will increase with no benefit to society, a clear
deadweight welfare loss.
2. Detection Phase
The detection phase begins when information about the falsity of
the representation begins to reach the market and has an impact. The
impact can be either a price adjustment to reflect the missing attribute
or a change in the attribute bundle or both. The detection phase con-
tinues until the adjustment is complete. Complete adjustment occurs
either when the price of the product no longer includes a payment for
the false attribute because the attribute is no longer affirmed or prom-
ised by sellers or when the attribute has been changed so that the false
representation is eliminated and the market price reflects an attribute
bundle buyers and sellers accurately believe is true. 200 During the de-
tection phase the representation is still being made by some, if not all,
sellers. The representation is still false to all, and and some buyers
and sellers have obtained knowledge of the representation's falsity.
As a result, the market terms (product price, attribute bundle, or affir-
mations) have begun to reflect the information concerning the repre-
sentation's falsity, but all adjustments have not been completed.
Some buyers will purchase the product believing the representation to
be true when it is false, some sellers will offer the term believing it is
still true, and the price paid for the claim will be less than in the initial
phase when all parties believed the representation to be true.
While the market is adjusting to the new information about the fal-
sity of the representation, there will be a period of time when buyers
may not be aware that the representation is false. Moreover, during
this adjustment period the price of the product will also be changing
to reflect the new information provided to the market about the falsity
of the representation. The question is how to treat buyer warranty
claims during this adjustment period.
The individual buyer who knew or through the exercise of reason-
able care should have known that a claim is false should not be al-
lowed to enforce the claim as a warranty in order to minimize the
costs from adverse selection and moral hazard and to reduce the risk
of loss according to the least-cost avoider principle. When, on the
other hand, the buyer neither knew nor should have known of the
200. Not all buyers and sellers need have complete information about the correct attribute
bundle. See infra text accompanying notes 208-09 (noting sellers that do not have such informa-
tion will be driven from the market, leaving behind those sellers who have complete information
and eliminate any falsehoods).
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falsity and paid for the attribute, the affirmation or promise should be
enforced as a warranty since the buyer's position and the representa-
tion are equivalent to what they are during the initial phase.201 En-
forcement will raise claim costs for sellers so they will have an
appropriate incentive to perform the optimal amount of testing and
inspection. Additionally, by enforcing claims buyers will not have an
incentive to undervalue uncertain claims, engage in inefficient inspec-
tion, or incur excessive bargaining costs.
A buyer may not have known that a representation was false but
may have paid a price that did not include an amount for the represen-
tation since the market had adjusted for information revealing the fal-
sity of the information. In this situation the question whether the
buyer should be able to enforce the representation as a warranty is a
difficult one. On the one hand, enforceability might be denied since
the price of the affirmation or promise is not included in the product's
price and there is no harm to the buyer in the form of paying for an
attribute which he did not receive. On the other hand, the buyers who
do not realize that the price does not include the representation will
suffer disappointment when they discover that the claim that they
thought was enforceable is not. Additionally, these buyers could suf-
fer real costs through having to find replacement goods possessing the
missing attribute or through incurring consequential losses.20 2
From an efficiency standpoint, the representation should not be en-
forceable as a warranty at least with respect to the buyer's direct eco-
nomic loss. Since the price does not include a payment for the
representation, marginal buyers (and sellers) have recognized the rep-
resentation's falsity, and the product price (or bundle) has adjusted.
Enforcing the warranty would signal marginal buyers that the bundle
201. There is no reason to expect additional adverse selection or moral hazard problems when
the warranty is enforced when a buyer neither knows nor has reason to know that a representa-
tion is false. In addition, enforcing the warranty term when the buyer does not know of the
falsity prevents the incentive for buyers to undertake inefficient inspection costs. Of course, the
buyer has paid for the attribute and the representation. The most efficacious way to generate
the information sellers need to discover the falsity of a representation is for the buyer to retain
an enforceable warranty claim. See supra text accompanying note 196 (enforcing representa-
tions that are false increases seller costs and provides a clear signal that a claim is not true).
202. The consequential losses could consist of injury to person or property or commercial
losses. For injury to person, a buyer who could not recover for breach of warranty probably
would be able to recover on a strict liability basis for misrepresentation. See supra note 99. If
the representation were enforceable as a warranty, a contract provision excluding liability for
personal injuries would be prima facie unconscionable, whereas a provision excluding commer-
cial loss would not. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1983). Given the ubiquitous nature of provisions exclud-
ing commercial consequential losses, the enforceability of an affirmation or promise which is not
included in a product's price will in many instances not affect the buyer's ability to recover for
such losses.
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still includes the term, even though the price has adjusted. Buyers
would get something of value (the warranty) for which they made no
payment until all sellers removed the representation from the market,
a process which might take a considerable period of time. The value
of marginal buyers bringing information to the market will be frus-
trated since the law would continue to respond as though the repre-
sentation were still part of the bundle of attributes being sold. In
addition resources will be misallocated since buyers will purchase too
much of the product because of the continued ability to enforce the
representation, and society will suffer deadweight losses from enforc-
ing the representations.2 03
On the other hand, a buyer who proved that he subjectively relied
on a representation even though it was not included in the price might
be able to recover for consequential losses resulting from such reli-
ance. Although the buyer should not recover for direct economic loss
as discussed in the prior paragraph, recovery for consequential loss
based on reasonable reliance is appropriate to convey information to
the seller to remove the false representation from the market. In this
situation, where the buyer does not know of the affirmation's falsity
nor should know of it through the exercise of reasonable care, the
seller is the least cost avoider of the consequential loss and should be
liable for it. To recover, however, the buyer should have to prove
reasonable reliance on the affirmation since the representation is not
included in the bundle of attributes being sold and the action is basi-
cally one for misrepresentation.
Finally, there will be instances where buyers purchase the product
believing the representation to be true but pay a price which is lower
than in the initial phase but still includes some value for the represen-
tation. Here the representation should be enforced as a warranty to
provide appropriate incentives for sellers to conduct appropriate test-
ing and to reduce the incentives for buyers to discount excessively
seller representations and engage in inefficient inspections. It might
be maintained that a buyer's remedy for breach of warranty should be
limited, however, based on the amount paid for the representation in
order to accurately reflect the value of the buyer's bargain.20 4 Under
203. The price is clearly below the old (initial phase) market equilibrium. Thus, the amount
buyers will be willing to purchase will exceed the amount sellers would like to sell. This will
cause the price to rise back to the original level-the price with the false claim valued as if true.
204. UCC Section 2-714(2) provides that a buyer is entitled to the difference in value between
the goods as warranted and as accepted by the buyer unless special circumstances show damages
of a different amount. If the market has discounted the price because of information about the
falsity of the warranted attribute, one could argue that, absent other circumstances such as a shift
in the value of the good in the market, the discounted price represents the value of the good as
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UCC section 2-714 the measure of damages for breach of warranty is
the difference in value between the goods as accepted and the value
they would have had if they had conformed to the warranty unless
there are special circumstances establishing damages of a different
amount. Ordinarily, a buyer who accepts a nonconforming good is
entitled to the entire difference in value between this good and a good
with the warranted attribute.20 5 If, however, evidence establishes that
the amount of damages to the particular buyer is not the same as this
difference in value, damages are to consist of this other amount.20 6
Where the price for the warranted attribute has been discounted
based on some perception of its falsity in the market, the remedy
might be restricted to the difference in value of the good without the
attribute and the good with the discounted value of the representation
in the market2 07 because that amount reflects the loss of the buyer's
actual bargain and provides an appropriate incentive for the seller to
minimize the loss of this bargain to the buyer. A difficulty with such a
remedy is that it would be costly to administer because it would be
necessary to ascribe a value to the good with the discounted warranty,
unless this amount were simply restricted to the purchase price.
Moreover, this value would vary over time as more information is ac-
quired about the representation's falsity. A further basis for allowing
a buyer the full recovery authorized by UCC section 2-714 is that the
warranted instead of what the good would have been worth if there had been no discount for the
false affirmation or promise. Cf. JOHN 0. HONNOLD ET AL., CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIAL
ON THE LAW OF SALES AND SECURED FINANCING 96 (1993). Suppose that a good sells for $1200
because of some information about the falsity of a warranty about one of its attributes. A buyer
purchases for that price and discovers that the good lacks the warranted attribute, does not
reject or revoke acceptance of the goods, but seeks the remedy provided by Section 2-714(2).
The value of the accepted good without the attribute is $1,000. The value of the good with the
attribute is $1,500. Under the restricted remedy discussed here, the buyer would receive $200,
the difference in value between the discounted price and the value of the good as accepted and
not the difference between the value of the good with the warranted attribute and the value of
the good as accepted, or $500.
205. Compare Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 670 F.2d 1304, 1306 (3rd Cir.
1982) (reasoning that the value of a good as warranted by the seller includes the benefit of a
particularly favorable contract price) with Melody Homes Mfg. Co. v. Morrison, 502 S.W.2d 196,
202 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1973) (stating that the value of a good as warranted is not restricted by
contract price but is determined by the market value) and Andrew M. Baker et al., Article Two
Warranties in Commercial Transactions, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 30, 113-115 (1978) (arguing that
the contract price is not dispositive as to the value of the goods). See generally W-n-E & SUM.
MERS, supra note 11, at 364-68.
206. See Alafoss v. Premium Corp. of America, 599 F.2d 232, 237 (8th Cir. 1979) (finding
damages for nonconforming goods were restricted when the buyer would have had to sell left-
over goods at a discount even if the goods had conformed to the warranty).
207. For an argument that a buyer's remedy for breach of warranty under UCC Section 2-
714(2) should be based on the purchase price paid as establishing the value of the goods as
warranted, see Chatlos Sys., Inc., 670 F.2d at 1307 (Rosen, J., dissenting).
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proposal to restrict recovery does not provide for a buyer's cost of
obtaining a substitute good with the attribute, and the seller should
bear this cost to have an appropriate incentive to provide the good
with the warranted attribute.
One additional issue concerning the enforceability of a representa-
tion arises during the detection phase. During the detection phase, it
may appear that the same product is offered on the market at two
different prices. Sellers who have not adjusted to the falsity of the
claim will still offer the product at the higher price believing the claim
is true. Those sellers who have learned that the representation is false
will adjust by lowering the price (or substituting new attributes of
equivalent value) and not making the representation. Buyers who
purchase from the former will be able to enforce the claim, while buy-
ers from the latter will not, an apparent differential treatment. In fact,
however, there is no differential treatment. The two sellers are offer-
ing two different product bundles, one with and one without the rep-
resentation at two different prices. Each bundle is a separate product
in the same sense that any two bundles represent different products to
the extent that the attributes are different. The bundle with the repre-
sentation is as different from the bundle without the representation as
a car is different from a tractor. Hence, there is no inconsistency in
differentiating between the claims of buyers of the two products: the
buyers with enforceable claims have paid for them, and those without
claims will have paid less for a different product that does not include
the affirmation or promise.
By basing enforceability on sellers' response to the falsity of a rep-
resentation, this rule will reward those sellers who adjust rapidly and
eliminate the classically false representations. Sellers who continue to
make the representation will experience higher costs than those who
learn the truth about the representation since claim costs will exceed
the amount that buyers will pay for the representation.
3. Completion Phase
The rules articulated above for warranty claims during the initial
and detection phases provide a cost penalty to sellers who do not
learn that the representation is classically false. Sellers who do not
learn and do not withdraw the representation will have to continue to
honor warranty claims, the cost of which will exceed the price derived
from selling the false representation. Because of this increasing cost
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and a shrinking market,208 sellers who do not learn that an affirmation
or promise is false will be driven from the market. Thus, eventually,
the only sellers left will be those who know of the classical falsity and
have responded by eliminating the representation. At this point the
market will have reached the completion phase.
The completion phase exists when all remaining sellers have ceased
offering the false representation and the market price has adjusted to
reflect the changed bundle of attributes. The completion phase does
not require that all buyers have knowledge of the falsity. However,
enough buyers know to change the market conditions as indicated
above.2o9
Once the completion phase is reached, therefore, the representation
is not included in the product bundle, and buyers are not paying for
the representation. Thus, any claim brought by a buyer should not be
enforced. Buyers only receive what they pay for, no more and no less.
Early in the completion phase some buyers may be disappointed in
the sense that they may still believe the product has the representation
and that they paid for the attribute. Since the attribute is missing,
they will bring a warranty claim and lose.
D. Idiosyncratic Representation Known to be False by Buyer
If a buyer knew, or through the exercise of reasonable care should
have known, that an idiosyncratic representation made to the buyer
was situationally false, the buyer should be precluded from enforcing
the representation as a warranty. Enforcing the representation would
not provide any incentive for the buyer to discover and reveal valua-
ble information to the seller, thus preventing an erroneous representa-
tion with its attendant consequences. As in mistaken bid cases,210 the
buyer should be precluded from "snapping up" the mistaken repre-
sentation which he knows or has reason to know is false.211 A buyer
should have an incentive to inform the seller of the mistake and avoid
any loss therefrom. Not enforcing the claim would provide an appro-
208. Marginal buyers will not purchase from sellers who continue to offer the classically false
claim because they are the ones who should know of its falsity and will be denied the enforce-
ment. Also, some non-marginal buyers will be responsive to the lower price available from
sellers who have removed the representation and purchase from them rather than the higher
priced sellers.
209. The ways in which the market can adjust to knowledge of the falsity of a representation
include: price adjustment and removal of the false term, provision of new term for the false one,
or product redesign.
210. United States Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 509 F.2d 1043 (6th Cir. 1975).
211. See Murray, supra note 6, at 294 (stating that a buyer who knows that a representation by
a seller is untrue has no expectation that goods will reflect the representation).
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priate incentive for the buyer to exercise care in avoiding misalloca-
tions of resources through the use of erroneous promises or
affirmations and to provide correct information to sellers. In addition,
to avoid adverse selection problems, the buyer should not be allowed
to enforce the representation. Where the affirmation or promise is
idiosyncratic, it is particularly appropriate for the law to provide such
incentives since the buyer probably has better access to the informa-
tion about a representation's falsity than when the claim is not
idiosyncratic.
If the law treats the false representation as unenforceable, the buyer
will not pay for the seller's claim, and it will be excluded from the
deal. If a buyer tells a seller that a representation is false and the
seller reaffirms the representation, the buyer should be able to en-
force the warranty to enable the parties to obtain the warranty terms
they perceive as mutually beneficial. Moreover, there is no adverse
selection problem if the seller decides to reaffirm the representation
since the seller can choose not to recommit itself if it considers ad-
verse selection a risk of making the reaffirmation.
E. Expert Buyer
The inability of a buyer to enforce a singularly false representation
as a warranty is particularly appropriate when the buyer is an expert
who knows or through the exercise of reasonable care should have
known that a representation is false.212 An expert buyer probably can
acquire information about a representation more cheaply than a non-
expert buyer and may likely have a comparative advantage vis-d-vis
the seller in discovering a representation's falsity. The expert buyer
should have an incentive to convey to the seller, and thereby to the
market, correct information about the product and its attributes. Un-
like circumstances in which an expert should not be required to reveal
to a seller information about positive product attributes,2 13 the buyer
is not using his expertise to move the good to a higher and better use.
Moreover, his inability to enforce as a warranty a representation he
knows is false should only minimally discourage his acquisition of ex-
pertise by denying any remedy for breach. Finally, providing an in-
212. Id. at 295 (stating that the expert buyer who examines the goods cannot reasonably rely
on the seller's representations as to the quality of the purchased goods).
213. See Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7
J. LEGAL SrUD. 1 (1978) (arguing that an expert buyer should not have to reveal to the seller
positive information about product attributes where the information is the result of a deliberate
and costly search, but the buyer may have a duty to disclose such information if it is casually
acquired).
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centive to disclose the falsity of the representation prior to purchase is
a less costly manner of avoiding the deleterious consequences of such
a representation than allowing the expert to obtain a remedy against
the seller.
When the expert cannot enforce the representation as a warranty,
the expert will not pay a price for the product that includes the value
of the representation and, therefore, will have an incentive to reveal
this information to the seller. Not allowing warranty enforcement in
this case will substantially reduce the problem of adverse selection.
The expert will have no incentive to purchase a product that he knows
is unsuited for his needs and cause him direct economic loss which he
should not have incurred.214
VI. DRAFT REVISION OF SECTION 2-313 AND THE MARKET TEST
The January 1996 draft of section 2-313 eliminates the basis of the
bargain requirement and provides that any seller affirmation or prom-
ise that is made or furnished to a buyer and that relates to the goods
becomes part of the agreement between the buyer and seller and is an
express warranty unless the seller proves that a reasonable person in
the buyer's position would conclude that the representation did not
become part of their agreement.21 5 If, however, a seller makes an af-
firmation or promise to a remote buyer 21 6 via a medium of communi-
cation to the public, the buyer must prove that he or she was
reasonable in concluding that the representation became part of the
agreement deemed to exist between the seller and buyer.217
In treating all seller representations about the goods, except those
affirmations or promises made to a remote buyer through a communi-
cation to the public, 218 as part of the parties' agreement and as express
warranties and placing the burden on a seller to establish that a rea-
sonable person in the buyer's position would not conclude that a rep-
214. The preclusion of the enforcement of a warranty by an expert buyer who knows or
through the exercise of reasonable care should know that a representation is false exceeds the
rule in UCC Section 2-715(2)(a) which precludes a buyer from recovering for losses that he
could reasonably have avoided. Preclusion from enforcing the representation as a warranty re-
suits in the buyer being unable to recover for direct as well as consequential losses, a result
which is appropriate when the buyer could have avoided the direct economic loss through utiliz-
ing the knowledge he possesses or exercising reasonable care in discovering the falsity of a claim.
215. See U.C.C. § 2-313(a), (d) (Proposed Draft January, 1996).
216. See U.C.C. § 2-318(a)(3) (Proposed Draft January 1996).
217. See U.C.C. § 2-313(b)(2) (Proposed Draft January, 1996). The Reporter's Notes to this
section state that although there is no agreement in fact between the seller and remote buyer,
there is "a bargain of sorts" between the two that is "created by and enforced under Article 2."
Reporter's Note 5 (1996).
218. See U.C.C. § 2-313(b)(2) (Proposed Draft January 1996).
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resentation was part of the agreement, the draft of section 2-313 takes
an approach similar to that advocated in comment 3 to the existing
section 2-313. According to that comment, once a buyer proves a rep-
resentation has been made relating to the goods, the burden is on the
seller to prove that it is not part of the deal.219 The Reporter's Note
to the September 1993 draft of section 2-313 indicated that a seller
could discharge its burden of establishing that a buyer was unreasona-
ble in concluding that a representation was part of an agreement by
proving that the buyer was unaware of, did not believe, or otherwise
did not rely on the representation. 220 Similarly, the Reporter's Note
to the October 1995 draft stated that a seller could rebut the presump-
tion of a warranty by proving that the buyer either was unaware of or
did not believe the representation or relied upon the skill and judg-
ment of a third person.221 Moreover, the Reporter's Note to the Oc-
tober 1995, draft stated that there was no requirement that a buyer "as
an initial matter" prove reliance on a representation to create an ex-
press warranty,222 implying that a proof of reliance might be relevant
rebutting the presumption that the representation was part of the par-
ties' agreement. The Reporter's Notes accompanying the 1996 draft
of section 2-313 do not discuss the manner in which a seller can estab-
lish that a reasonable person in the buyer's position would not reason-
ably conclude that an affirmation or promise became part of their
agreement. But, other than eliminating the language that a seller's
affirmation or promise relating to the goods is "presumed" to be part
of the parties' agreement, the 1996 draft of the section has not
changed the substance of the provision requiring the seller to prove
that a reasonable person in the buyer's position would not conclude
that such a representation were part of the agreement, making it rea-
sonable to believe that no changes were intended in the factors which
a seller can utilize in proving that an affirmation or promise was not
part of an agreement.223
219. U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 3 (1994).
220. Adler, supra note 18, at 473 (citing U.C.C. § 2-313 (Proposed Official Draft, September
10, 1993)).
221. U.C.C. § 2-313 Reporter's Note 4 (Proposed Draft October 1995).
222. Id.
223. The Reporter's Notes indicate that although the October 1996 draft drops the language
of presumption, "the effect [of the draft] is roughly the same." Reporter's Note 2 (1996). The
proposal says that once it is established that a seller made or furnished to a buyer an affirmation
or promise relating to the goods, the affirmation or promise becomes part of the agreement and
is an express warranty unless the seller proves that a reasonable person in the position of the
buyer would conclude otherwise. U.C.C. § 2-313(b)(3) (Proposed Draft January, 1996). The lan-
guage of the proposal does not say that there is a presumption that a representation of the
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As discussed above,224 the Reporter's Notes to the 1993 and Octo-
ber 1995 drafts indicate that one of the factors a seller can invoke to
negate inclusion of an affirmation or promise in an agreement is reli-
ance.225 The notes inappropriately undermine the enforceability as
warranties of affirmations or promises by stating that there is no war-
ranty if a buyer did not rely on an affirmation or promise or relied on
the skill and judgment of a third person rather than on the seller's
representation. 226 The apparent basis for the latter standard is that
the buyer did not rely on the seller's representation but on the third
person. By injecting a reliance requirement, the notes inefficiently in-
creases transaction costs in the creation of express warranties and
deny enforceability to affirmations and promises that are included in a
product's price. As discussed above,227 reliance on the skill and judg-
ment of a third person or on the buyer's own inspection should not
vitiate the existence of a warranty particularly when it is a representa-
tion that would be made to anyone in the market and is captured in
the product's price. Even when a seller's affirmation or promise is an
idiosyncratic one, valuable only to the buyer, reliance on a third per-
son's judgment should not negate the existence of a warranty so long
as there is evidence of negotiation with respect to the claim because
the buyer's utilization of the third person's judgment may be simply
verification of the seller's representation. Only if the evidence estab-
lishes that there is a price discount excluding the affirmation or prom-
ise from the deal should enforcement of the representation be denied.
character established by the buyer is part of the agreement. Rather, it provides that such evi-
dence makes the affirmation or promise part of the agreement unless a seller proves otherwise.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 221-23.
225. Under the 1996 Proposed Draft, an affirmation or promise is made to a remote buyer via
a communication to the public, the buyer has the burden of proving that the buyer was reason-
able in concluding that the representation became part of the deemed agreement with the seller.
U.C.C. § 2-313(b)(2) (Proposed Draft January 1996). The Reporter's Note makes clear that the
difference between the situations of a remote and an immediate buyer is that the seller has to
establish that a reasonable person in the immediate buyer's position would not conclude that the
representation was part of the agreement whereas the remote buyer must prove that its belief as
to inclusion of the representation was reasonable. Reporter's Note 6 (1996). The Note does not
indicate, however, that the factors relevant to the reasonableness of the relevant belief vary
based on whether the buyer is an immediate or remote buyer. Moreover, the Reporter's Notes
to the 1995 draft dealt with at least one of those factors, knowledge of the affirmation or prom-
ise, in a context that pertained to a remote buyer. Reporter's Note 5 (1995). Thus, the factors,
such as reliance, that are discussed in the text with respect to immediate buyers are equally
applicable to remote buyers. The only difference in treatment is that the remote buyer has to
prove that it knew of, believed in, and relied on the seller's affirmation or promise.
226. See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text (discussing buyer's reliance on third party
sources of information).
227. See supra Section IV.D (discussing the general principle that inspection does not pre-
clude the creation of a warranty when the warranty is made to the market in general).
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According to the Reporter's Note to the 1995 draft, a seller can also
prove that a reasonable person would not believe that an affirmation
or promise was part of the parties' agreement by proving that the
buyer did not believe the representation. 228 As discussed previ-
ously,229 a buyer who knows or through the exercise of reasonable
care should know that a representation is singularly false in his trans-
action should be precluded from enforcing the claim. Similarly, if the
buyer inspects the goods and discovers or through the exercise of rea-
sonable care should discover that a representation is false or that the
goods do not conform to a claim, he should be precluded from
purchasing the good and enforcing the representation as a warranty.
In these instances and in cases where the affirmation or promise is
classically or universally false and the buyer knows or through the ex-
ercise of reasonable care should know it, the buyer should be pre-
cluded from enforcing the representation even, in situations where the
buyer subjectively knows the claim is false, if the seller knew the rep-
resentation was false. Denying enforcement to a representation in
these circumstances not only protects against adverse selection and
moral hazard but also averts a deadweight loss resulting from the
transfer of resources from the person making the representation to
the person claiming to have relied on it. The basis in the Reporter's
Note for establishing that a reasonable person would not consider that
a representation was part of an agreement, disbelief in an affirmation
or promise, is predicated on the conclusion that buyers who disbelieve
claims either do not believe or are unreasonable in believing that the
representation is part of the agreement. The defense to a warranty
that we advocate is different. Our defense is based on information
that a buyer has or should have about the truthfulness of a representa-
tion rather than on the buyer's subjective conviction or state of mind
about the representation's truthfulness. Moreover, our standard for
refusing to enforce a false representation as a warranty is based on
avoiding the inefficient consequences of either knowingly purchasing
a false representation or failing to invest sufficient resources to dis-
cover its falsity and on providing correct incentives for the person with
the better access to information to disclose the representation's falsity.
This standard better accords with an efficient market test for
warranties.
The language in the 1996 draft concerning a seller's proof that a
reasonable person in the buyer's position would conclude that a repre-
228. U.C.C. § 2-313 Reporter's Note 4 (Proposed Draft October 1995).
229. See supra Section V.B and accompanying text (precluding enforcement avoids misalloca-
tion of resources, adverse selection, and moral hazard).
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sentation did not become part of the parties' agreement appears suffi-
cient to deal with claims regarding experimental products. Since there
is no market price to capture such representations and since buyers
should understand that the seller faces a substantial probability of be-
ing unable to produce the represented product or does not have a
comparative advantage in providing the buyer with a remedy should
the product not be produced, the claims should not be considered
warranties unless the seller makes clear that he will produce the prod-
uct or provide a remedy. In providing that a representation is not part
of the agreement if it is unreasonable for a person in the position of
the buyer so to conclude, the draft gives courts sufficient latitude to
refuse enforcement of claims that the above circumstances would indi-
cate are merely commitments to exert reasonable efforts to produce
the experimental good.
One of the greater deficiencies subsumed in the 1996 draft and ar-
ticulated in the 1995 Reporter's Notes is the requirement that a buyer
know of an affirmation or promise prior to the time of purchase for
the representation to be part of the parties' agreement.230 The 1993
and 1994 drafts of section 2-313 each provided that a buyer could en-
force as a warranty an affirmation or promise made to the public even
if the buyer was unaware of the representation. 231 The Reporter's
Note to the 1993 draft stated:
If the advertising is current at the time of contracting, and other
buyers were aware of and believed it, there is no reason to protect
the seller against claims by buyers who purchased without informa-
tion or with disbelief. All buyers paid a market price for an adver-
tised product, and the seller should be held to the public warranties
made.232
Although deficient in a number of respects, 233 the prior drafts repre-
sented a substantial improvement over existing cases that require a
230. U.C.C. § 2-313 Reporter's Notes 4-5 (Proposed Draft October, 1995).
231. See U.C.C. § 2-313 Reporter Notes (1993 & 1994).
232. See U.C.C. § 2-313 Reporter Note (1993).
233. The drafts inappropriately denied enforceability to market representations made in an
individually negotiated or singular transaction. As discussed above, affirmations or promises
that a seller makes in such a transaction should be enforceable without prior buyer knowledge of
the representations so long as they are representations that any member of the market would
value. See supra part IlI.B. Although the proposals appeared to cover representations made to
the public in media such as advertising, it was unclear whether they applied to affirmations or
promises found in manuals and on writings found in product containers. Similarly, it was unclear
whether the drafts governed affirmations and promises found in standard form contracts even
though such documents contain terms generated in the market in a manner similar to other
market terms. The 1994 draft also excessively narrowed the effect of affirmations or promises
that are made to the market. The draft provided that a seller could rebut the presumption that a
representation was part of an agreement in a "public" affirmation or promise case by proving
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buyer to have had knowledge of a representation made to the market
prior to the time of purchase.234
The Reporter's Note to the 1995 draft indicated that the 1993 and
1994 proposals allowing a buyer unaware of a representation made to
the public to enforce it as a warranty were eliminated from the 1995
draft, and thereafter the 1996 draft, for three reasons. First, the pro-
posals went beyond existing case law.235 Although the overwhelming
weight of case law imposes a knowledge requirement, 236 it is difficult
to perceive such case law as a reason for including such a requirement
in the revised Article II. A purpose for revising Article II is to change
at least some parts of existing law.237 Moreover, the revised Article II
is to become part of a code, one of whose central purposes is to mod-
ernize the law governing commercial transactions.2 38 Retention of the
knowledge requirement will do just the opposite, for that requirement
and the case law imposing it are based on faulty understandings of the
manner in which markets create warranty and other terms and on a
failure to recognize the inefficiencies of a knowledge requirement. To
retain the knowledge requirement and follow these cases would only
perpetuate these mistakes and make it more costly for buyers and sell-
ers to create and buyers to enforce express warranties for which they
that the affirmation or promise was made to a segment of the public of which the buyer was not
a part. U.C.C. § 2-313 Reporter's Notes (Proposed Draft 1994). This provision clearly was at
odds with how markets establish prices and allocate resources. Since buyers and sellers can
easily move between geographical market "boundaries," since goods flow freely within markets,
and since prices do not "know" buyers or boundaries, it is not clear what being outside a market
segment means. If a buyer purchases a product at the market price, the buyer has purchased all
the attributes in the bundle, notwithstanding any seller's intention to exclude some buyers. In
addition, information about products moves quickly, and in most cases efficiently, over both time
and space. Thus, when a homogeneous product is offered for sale, the general terms will be
included in the market, independent of the sellers' expectations. Only where a seller specifically
prices a product for a sub-market segment, and makes differential terms known to the market,
should the law preclude a buyer from being able to enforce an affirmation or promise as a
warranty.
234. See supra notes 71 and 81 (discussing the split in authority concerning whether a buyer
need have been aware of an affirmation, promise, or description for it become part of the
bargain).
235. U.C.C. § 2-313 Reporter's Note 5 (Proposed Draft October, 1995).
236. See supra cases collected in notes 71, 81 (listing numerous cases from various jurisdictions
imposing a knowledge requirement).
237. See U.C.C. § 2-207 (Proposed Draft January, 1996) (revising existing U.C.C. § 2-207 and
requiring express agreement (except in transactions involving standard form records) to all stan-
dard terms, including those in an offer, that materially alter the terms of the agreement); see also
Proposed UCC § 2-316(e) (requiring a consumer to expressly agree to a disclaimer of the im-
plied warranty of merchantability or fitness for purpose, a requirement not imposed by existing
§ 2-316).
238. See U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (the purpose of the UCC includes the simplification, clarification,
modernization, expansion and uniformity of the law governing commercial transactions).
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pay. The second reason for eliminating the 1993 and 1994 proposals
was that they appeared to create a tort claim.239 This assertion appar-
ently is premised on a notion that the seller's liability where a buyer is
unaware of an affirmation or promise is noncontractual in nature. As
discussed earlier, 40 however, as a matter of contract law a party who
assents to a bargain should be able to enforce one of its terms even if
he was unaware of the term at the time of entering into the contract.
Granting such enforcement is consistent with the manner in which
contract law views contracting behavior, i.e., based on the objective
behavior of the parties, and with the manner in which parties in fact
enter into such exchanges. Parties entering into contracts today bar-
gain for an entire bundle of attributes and terms, most of which are
dictated by the market, some or many of which are unknown to the
parties. To enforce such bargains is not to depart from contract to tort
law but rather to recognize the manner in which parties efficiently es-
tablish the terms of their bargains. Finally, the 1995 draft, and there-
after the 1996 draft, deleted the prior proposals to eliminate the
knowledge requirement in affirmations or promises made to the pub-
lic because the proposals would have been difficult to apply.241
Although there were a number of deficiencies in the 1993 and 1994
draft proposals, 242 the test we propose for an express warranty is not
difficult to apply. Whether an affirmation or promise is part of an
agreement depends on whether the seller made or would have made
the representation to the market as a whole. 243 If the seller contends
that the representation is not part of a sale, he must prove by statisti-
cal tests that the representation was not included in the market
price 2 "4 or that the parties to the contract specially negotiated to re-
move the warranty generally through a lower price. If a seller proves
that a representation is idiosyncratic in character, the buyer must
prove that there was negotiation over the term or that the buyer relied
on the seller's affirmation or promise. As discussed earlier, these
239. U.C.C. § 2-313 Reporter's Note 5 (Proposed Draft October, 1995).
240. See supra text accompanying notes 110-29 (discussing the general principle that the affir-
mations or promises contained in a bargain should be enforceable irrespective of whether the
buyer was aware of, or valued, such affirmations or promises).
241. U.C.C. § 2-313 Reporter's Note 5 (Proposed Draft October, 1995).
242. See supra note 233 (these deficiencies included the denial of enforceability for market
representations made in individually negotiated transactions and a lack of clarity as to whether
affirmations or promises found in manuals or standard form contracts are covered).
243. See supra text accompanying notes 74-78 (discussing the market test under which affir-
mations or promises which are demonstrably offered to the market as a whole may be included
as express warranties).
244. See supra text accompanying note 76 (referring to the use of statistical tests).
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standards are consistent with how markets operate and provide effi-
cient rules for warranty creation.
Although the 1996 draft excessively restricts some representations
from being treated as warranties, it appears to perpetuate the present
section's inappropriate enforcement of post-contract affirmations and
promises. Such claims should be treated as warranties only when a
seller makes them to retain the buyer's goodwill, when the representa-
tions are made to meet changed conditions, or when the representa-
tions are given to have the buyer forgo his right to reject or revoke
acceptance of nonconforming goods. The draft continues the rule
under the existing Code that post-contract representations are en-
forceable without these limitations thereby enforcing purely gratui-
tous promises which ought not be considered part of the parties'
agreement. 245
VII. CONCLUSION
Markets create product bundles and prices to reflect the attributes
being offered by the seller and valued by the buyer. Whether an affir-
mation or promise is part of a bargain is defined by the price estab-
lished in the market. Thus, reliance and individual negotiation are not
required for creating express warranties except for idiosyncratic com-
mitments or representations. The appropriate text suggested by this
article is to determine what terms are being offered in the market.
The suggested test promotes efficiency, reduces uncertainty, and pro-
vides incentives to correct false representations made by sellers.
This test can be easily implemented and interpreted by courts, thus
reducing litigation and other forms of transaction costs. Moreover,
this test would provide incentives for sellers to be more cautious about
the nature of the claims which they offer to the whole market, since
these claims will be incorporated into the market price and thus be
enforceable as warranties by all purchasers except those who know, or
through the exercise of reasonable care should know, the claims are
false. Thus, this test will improve the flow of valuable information
into the market in a manner which will benefit both buyers and sellers.
This market based test also provides for appropriate enforcement of
warranties and correct behavioral incentives where the affirmation or
245. The Reporter's Note indicates that a seller might establish that a reasonable person in
the buyer's position would not have concluded that a representation was part of the agreement
by proving that the affirmation or promise was stale. Reporter's Note 5 (1995). Again the lan-
guage of the section appears adequate to deal with representations that should be considered as
lapsed either by their own terms or by the circumstances. U.C.C. § 2-313 Reporter's Note 5
(Proposed Draft October, 1995).
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promise being offered to the market is false. Not only does the pro-
posed approach disqualify from enforcing a representation as a war-
ranty anyone who purchases knowing it is false but also anyone who
should have discovered the falsity of the representation through the
exercise of reasonable care. Finally, this Article's model demonstrates
how the claims of various buyers should be treated while the market
goes through the several phases of discovering that a representation is
classically false.
Finally, the current revision draft of section 2-313 (proposed section
2-313) needs substantial modification. Most importantly, the draft
needs to be amended to make clear that a buyer need not know of nor
rely on an affirmation or promise made to the market in order for the
representation to be part of the parties' agreement and therefore an
express warranty. Unless so amended, the revision to Article II will
not modernize commercial law for the 21st century but perpetuate a
faulty notion about how warranty terms become part of parties' agree-
ments, impose inefficient contracting rules and deprive buyers of the
terms for which they have paid.
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